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I. 
Government  price  control  programs  in  the  U.S. 
began  over  two  hundred  years  ago.  More  recently, 
credit  controls,  which  are  a special  case  of price  con- 
trols,  entered  the  arsenal  of policy  instruments.  Credit 
control  programs  involve  regulation  of either  the  price 
of credit-interest  rates-or  the  quantity  of credit  ex- 
tended  for  various  purposes.a  Credit  controls  can 
be  S&?&W or  general. Selective  controls  affect  the 
price  or quantity  of specific  types  of credit,  whereas 
general  controls  are  designed  to  affect  the  aggregate 
amount  of  credit  used.b 
The  most  recent  implementation  of credit  controls 
in  the  U.S.  was  in  the  spring  of  1980,  under  the 
Carter  Administration.  Surprisingly,  to  date  there  has 
been  no  comprehensive  study  of  the  1980  experi- 
ence.  To  fill  this  gap,  this  article  focuses  on  the 
(1)  1980  credit  control  experience,  (2) history  of the 
legislation  that  made  those  controls  possible,  and 
(3) economic  and  political  motivation  for using  such 
controls.  The  1980  episode  warrants  close  scrutiny 
because  it  teaches  three  lessons.  First,  credit 
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a Restrictions  on  the  quantity  of credit  are  a form  of price  con- 
trol  in that  they  are usually  implemented  through  changes  in the 
terms  of  lending  that  alter  the  effective  interest  rate. 
b The  term  “credit  control”  is  sometimes  used  synonymously 
with  “credit  allocation.”  “  Credit  control”  as  used  in  this  oaoer 
refers  only  to policies  that  directly  allocate  credit,  as in the  case 
of selective  credit  controls.  In contrast,  “credit  allocation”  is more 
general,  encompassing  selective  credit  controls,  but  also  refer- 
ring  to  any  policy  that  affects  interest  rates  and  thus  indirectly 
alters  the  distribution  of  credit.. 
controls  may  not  deliver  the  desired  results.  Second, 
they  may  have  unintended  and  unforeseen  adverse 
effects.  Third,  political  realities  may  tempt  policy- 
makers  to  impose  credit  controls  again  despite  un- 
fortunate  previous  experiences  with  such  policies. 
Section  II provides  a brief  review  of credit  control 
experience  before  1980.  Selective  credit  controls 
were  first imposed  in  194 1 and were  used  twice  more 
before  1952.  These  programs  were  all similar  in that 
they  set  minimum  downpayments  and  maximum 
maturities  for  credit  purchases  of various  consumer 
durables.  Congress  repealed  the  legislation  that  per- 
mitted  the  use  of  such  credit  controls  in  1953  and 
reinstated  the  legislative  authority  in  1969  with  the 
passage  of the  Credit  Control  Act  that  year.  Section 
III examines  the  legislative  history  of the  1969  Act, 
which  conferred  upon  the  President  the  authority  to 
direct  the  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve 
System  (hereafter,  the  Board)  to  control  “any  or  all 
extensions  of credit.”  The  sole  upe of this  authority 
occurred  in  March  1980,  when  President  Carter 
invoked  the  Act.  Section  IV attempts  to reconstruct, 
using  internal  Administration  memoranda,  the 
political  and  economic  factors  motivating  Carter’s 
decision  to  impose  credit  controls.  The  evidence 
suggests  that  Carter’s  advisers  supported  the  use  of 
selective  credit  controls  focusing  on  consumer  credit 
for  political  reasons. 
Details  of the  Board’s  1980  credit  control  program 
appear  in  Section  V.  Unlike  the  programs  used  in 
the  1941  to  1952  period,  the  Board’s  1980  program 
left  decisions  regarding  credit  allocation  to  individual 
lenders.  Section  V argues  that  the  program’s  scope 
and  intent  were  not  clearly  communicated  to  the 
public  and  thus  caused  considerable  confusion. 
Section  VI documents  the  economy’s  response  to the 
program,  while  Section  VII  argues  that  the  control 
program  might  have  made  the  1980  recession  more 
pronounced  than  it  otherwise  would  have  been, 
largely  because  of  its  effect  on  consumers’  buying 
psychology.  Congressional  debates  over  repeal  of the 
Credit  Control  Act  in  1982  and  subsequent  repeated 
attempts  to  reenact  the  legislation  are  described 
in  Section  VIII.  Finally,  Section  IX  concludes  by 
considering  the  likelihood  of  credit  controls  in  the 
future; 
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THE U.S. EXPERIENCE  WITH 
CREDITCONTROLSBEFORE~~S~ 
America’s  experience  with  price  control  programs 
began  while  the  country  was  in  its  infancy.  The 
New  England  colonies  used  wage  and  price  controls 
as early  as  1630.  After  winning  independence  from 
Great  Britain,  the  Continental  Congress  and  many 
of the  states  also experimented  repeatedly  with  wage 
and price  control  programs.  However,  these  policies 
all failed  to meet  their  goal  of checking  the  inflation 
generated  by  the  printing  of  paper  currencies  to 
finance  federal  and  state  expenditures.  In  response 
to  these  failures,  Congress  passed  a  resolution  on 
June  4,  1780,  recommending  that  the  states  repeal 
all price  controls  because 
it hath  been  found  by experience  that  limitations  upon  the 
prices  of commodities  are  not  only  ineffectual  for the  pur- 
poses  proposed,  but  likewise  productive  of very  evil conse- 
quences  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  public  service  and 
grievous  oppression  of  individuals.’ 
These  early  attempts  at  price  controls  did  not 
involve  credit.  In  fact,  America  waited  almost  150 
years  for its first  taste  of credit  controls.  In October 
1917,  to assist  with  the  mobilization  for World  War 
I, Congress  enacted  the  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act 
(40  Stat.  415)  that,  under  section  5(b),  gave  the 
President  the  authority  to regulate  credit  during  war- 
time.  However,  credit  controls  were  not  imposed 
during  World  War  I,  although  wage  and  price  con- 
trols  were.  President  Roosevelt  was  the  first. to  use 
the  Presidential  authority  to  regulate  credit.  On 
August  9,  1941,  he  issued  Executive  Order  #8843 
directing  the  Board  to  regulate  consumer  credit  to 
ease  the  transition  to  a wartime  economy.  Presum- 
ably,  by  restricting  consumer  credit,  overall  credit 
use  and  consumer  spending  would  be  reduced,  free- 
ing resources  for a military  buildup  while  restraining 
inflationary  pressures.  Credit  controls  were  viewed 
as necessary  for fighting  inflation  because  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  (hereafter,  the  Fed)  was  com- 
mitted  to maintaining  low interest  rates,  which  made 
its standard  tools  unavailable  for controlling  inflation. 
The  Board  responded  to  Roosevelt’s  executive 
order  by  issuing  Regulation  W  on  September  1, 
1941.2  Among  its  provisions,  Regulation  W  set 
minimum  downpayments  and  maximum  maturities 
on credit  purchases  for consumer  durables  and  semi- 
durables.  Regulation  W  (revised  effective  May  6, 
1942)  included  anexpanded  list of commodities  and 
covered  all  types  of  consumer  credit  (e.g.  single- 
payment  loans,  installment  loans  and  sales,  and 
charge  account  purchases).  Total  consumer  credit 
outstanding  dropped  by 50 percent  over  the  first two 
years  that  Regulation  W was  in use.  This  reduction 
may  in part  have  been  caused  by  the  unavailability 
of  many  consumer  durable  goods,  rather  than  the 
credit  control  program.  On  August  8,  1947,  while 
the  controls  were  in  place,  Congress  passed  legis- 
lation  (61 Stat.  92 1) removing  as of November  1 the 
President’s  authority  to impose  credit  controls  unless 
the  U.S.  were  again  at  war  or  a  state  of  national 
emergency  were  declared. 
On  November  17,  1947,  President  Truman 
asked  Congress  for  the  authority  to  reinstate  con- 
sumer  credit  controls  to  deal  with  the  postwar 
inflation.  This  authority  was  granted  on August  16, 
1948  (62 Stat.  92 l),  and controls  were  imposed  again 
under  Regulation  W  from  September  20,  1948 
until June  30,  1949,  when  the  authority  expired.  This 
was  the  first  and  only  peacetime  use  of credit  con- 
trols  before  1980. 
Selective  credit  controls  also  were  imposed  dur- 
ing  the  Korean  War.  Congress  granted  the  Board 
emergency  authority  for temporary  controls  through 
section  601  of title VI of the  Defense  Production  Act 
of  September  8,  1950  (89  Stat.  810).3  Under  this 
authority,  the  Board  reestablished  Regulation  W, 
instituting  minimum  downpayment  requirements 
ranging  from  10  percent  to  33%  percent  of  the 
purchase  price  and  a maximum  maturity  of  18 to 30 
months.  These  restrictions  had  fairly  broad  public 
support;  400  economists  signed  a letter  to  Senator 
Joseph  O’Mahoney,  dated  January  2 1,  195 1, urging 
the  use  of selective  credit  controls  on consumer  and 
real  estate  credit  and  loans  for  securities  as  a “first 
line  of defense  against  inflation.“4  On  May  7,  1952, 
the  control  program  was  lifted. 
While  the  controls  were  in  place,  however,  a 
congressional  subcommittee  studied  the  economic 
effects  of the  selective  credit  controls  used  between 
1948  and  19.5  1.5 A  majority  of  the  subcommittee 
found  that  these  controls  had  allocated  credit  ineffi- 
ciently.  The  subcommittee’s  findings  resulted  in 
congressional  repeal  in  1953  of  the  President’s 
authority  to  invoke  mandatory  controls  under  the 
Defense  Production  Act.6 Congress  did not  grant  the 
President  this  authority  again  until  1969.’ 
III. 
THE CREDITCONTROLACTOF  1969: 
THEBASISFORTHE~~~O  EPISODE 
From  1953,  when  the  authority  for standby  credit 
controls  expired,  until  1969,  House  Representative 
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ment  to  reenact  credit  control  legislation.  She 
repeatedly  argued  that  such  authority  would  be 
needed  in wartime.  In  1966,  with  the  U.S.  mobiliz- 
ing  for  the  Vietnam  War  and  inflationary  pressures 
building,  Sullivan and Representative  Henry  S. Reuss 
sponsored  H.R.  14025,  an  amendment  to  the 
Defense  Production  Act  that  would  reinstate  the 
President’s  standby  authority.  The  House  defeated 
the  bill,  presumably  in part  because  hearings  were 
not  held  on  the  amendment.8 
Congressional  defeat  of H.R.  14025  apparently  did 
not  weaken  Sullivan’s  resolve  to  achieve  passage  of 
credit  control  legislation.  She  raised  the  issue  again 
in August  1967,  during  congressional  subcommittee 
hearings  on the Consumer  Credit  Protection  Act,  and 
yet  again  in June  1969,  during  hearings  on  the  in- 
crease  in the prime  interest  rate.  Finally,  in late  1969, 
Sullivan  and  Reuss  attached  an amendment  to H.R. 
15091,  a  bill  extending  the  authority  of  financial 
regulatory  agencies  to  set  interest  rate  ceilings  on 
savings  accounts,  time  deposits,  and  certificates  of 
deposit.9  A House  report  (from the  Banking  and Cur- 
rency  Committee)  set  forth  the  motivation  for  the 
amendment: 
The  majority  of the  committee  .  . . believe[s]  the  present 
administration  is  about  to  achieve  at  one  and  the  same 
time  continuing  inflation  and  a recession.  By its monolithic 
super-tight-money  attack  on  inflation,  it  is not  only  failing 
to cure  inflation,  on  savings  institutions,  on small  business, 
and  [those]  . . . who  are now  kept  from  gainful employment 
by  the  administration’s  policies.  .  .  .  . 
. . . [The  amendment  to] H.R.  1509,l would  help  correct 
this  situation  by  providing  discretionary  authority  to  the 
President  to authorize  the  Federal  Reserve  Board to control 
extension of credit, particularly  con.wner credit and unnecessary 
bank  business lending.  This  will  enable  specific  attacks  on 
inflationary  areas,  and  thus  make  unnecessary  the  present 
across-the-board  supertight  money  which  threatens  unem- 
ployment  and  recession.iO  [emphasis  added] 
The  economic  reasoning  behind  the  legislation 
was  the  same  as that  for  the  ,earlier  Sullivan-Reuss 
amendments.  As explained  in a Joint Economic  Com- 
mittee  report, 
The  use  of general  interest  rate  increases  to  fight  inflation 
is  not  neutral  in  its’effects  on  the  economy.  It  tends  to 
fall most  heavily  on small  businessmen  and  on construction 
and  other  long-term  investment  and  is  not  particularly 
effective  in  curbing  speculative  excesses. 
When  businessmen  begin  to accumulate  excess  inventory 
because  of anticipated  price  rises,  or to overinvest  in plant 
and  equipment,  their  profit  expectations  are  so  high  that 
only  very  large  interest  rate  increases  will  deter  them.  In 
these  sectors  of the  economy,  interest  rate  increases  may 
have  an  inflationary  rather  than  a  deflationary  effect.  On 
the  other  hand,  residential  construction,  .which  we  do  not 
want  to  discourage,  is  hit  much  harder  by  higher  rates. 
This  committee  believes  that  it  would  be  preferable  to 
concentrate  on  a prudent  and  limited  ‘restriction of consutner 
credit as an  ahniative  to general rredit restraint.  Consumer 
credit,  we know;  is not  dependent  on interest  costs  because 
consumers  think  primarily  in terms  of the  periodic  payment 
they  are required  to make  and,  within  broad  limits,  are not 
deterred  or encouraged  by interest  rate  changes.”  [empha- 
sis  added] 
Congress  never  determined  whether  the  economic 
rationale  for the  amendment  was  sound.  Time  was 
not  available  for committee  hearings  on  the  amend- 
ment  because  the  House  was  scheduled  to consider 
the  bill less than  a week  before  December  2 1,  1969, 
the  expiration  date  of  the  original  authority  to  set 
interest  rate  ceilings.  Sullivan  argued  that  the  issue 
of  standby  credit  controls  had  been  the  subject’  of 
several  hearings  by  the  Committee  on  Banking  and 
Currency,  so the  House  should  not  postpone  judg- 
ment  on the  amendment  until,further  hearings  could 
be  arranged.  Further  support  for the  bill came  from 
the  Fed.‘2  Apparently,  Sullivan’s  argument  was per- 
suasive.  What  congressional  debate  did occur  focused 
on  the  growth  of  consumer  credit,  its  inflationary 
potential  and  the  possible  need  for  credit  controls 
of the  type  Regulation  W ‘imposed.‘3 The  House  and 
Senate  passed  a compromise  version  of the  bill  on 
December  19 without  formal hearings,  and President 
Nixon  signed  the  legislation  on December  24,  1969, 
making  it  Public  Law  91-151.’  ‘. 
The  Sullivan-Reuss  amendment  is Title  II of P.L. 
91-151  (-12 U.S.C.  1901-1909  (1969)),  commonly 
known  as the Credit  Control  Act.(CCA).,  Section  205 
of Title  II  states  that 
whenever  the  President  determines  that  such  action  is 
necessary  or  appropriate  for  the  purpose  of preventing  or 
controlling  inflation  generated  by the  extension  of credit  in 
an  excessive  volume,  the  President  may  authorize  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  to  regulate  and  control  any  or al 
extensions  of credit.  [emphasis  added] 
The  CCA  granted  the  President  and  the  Board 
almost  dictatorial  power  over credit  use.  As described 
by  the  minority  view, 
’ Conference  Report  No.  91-769  explains  that  the  Senate’s  ver- 
sion  of the  interest  rate  ceiling  legislation  (S.  2577)  contained 
a  provision  to  permit  the  use  of  voluntary  credit  control 
agreements  like those  used  during  the  Korean  War.  P.L.  91-151 
granted  standby  credit  control  authority  of the  type  included  in 
both  the  House  and  Senate  bills.  -The  conference  report  states 
that  both  types  of controls  were  included  in  the  legislation  so 
that  “the President  would  be afforded  the  broadest  possible  spec- 
trum  of  alternatives  in  fighting  inflation,  curbing  unnecessary 
extensions  of credit,-and  channeling  credit  into  housing  and  other 
essential  purposes.”  See  “Banking-Interest  Rate  Ceilings- 
Credit  Control:  P.L.  91-151;”  p.  1522. 
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Board  power  to  regulate  and  control  afly or a//  extensions 
of credit  including maximum  amounts,  terms  and conditions, 
and  maximum  rates  of  interest  which  of  course.  would 
establish  a national  usury  law. The authority  could.only  be 
activated  by the  President  to the  extent  and for such  period 
of time  as  he  might  determine. 
This  is far broader  credit  control  authority  than  has  ever 
before  been  granted.  .  .  . 
If fully invoked,  it would  be  heady  power  for  the  Fed- 
complete  credit  control  over  all of our  economy,  nonbank- 
ing  as  well  as  banking  institutions,  whether.creatures  of 
State  or  Federal  government,’  and  all individuals.  It would 
establish  a.complete  credit  police  ,state.i4  [emphasis  as  in 
original] 
The  Nixon  Administration  had  made  clear  that  it 
did not  want  standby  authority  for consumer  credit 
controls.  ‘President  Nixon  signed  the  legislation 
only  because  he  wanted  to,’  extend  the  Board’s  au- 
thority  to  impose  interest  rate  ceilings.  In, fact,  he 
described  ttie  legislation  as  “unnecessary  and 
undesirable”  and warned  that  its use would  move’the 




THECREDITCONTROLACNN  198OP 
Credit  controls  were  discussed  as a possible  policy 
tool  throughout  Jimmy  Carter’s  presidency,  although 
they  were  not  imposed  until  ‘March  1980.  The 
economic  and  political  factors  leading  to  Carter’s 
imposition  of  selective  credit  controls  under  the 
CCA  date  back  to, January  1977,  when  he  was 
inaugurated.d 
Carter’s  First  TWO Years  in.Offce 
Carter’s  first year  in office was the economy’s  third 
consecutive  year  of expansion.  The  Administration’s 
stimulative  programs  increased  government  spending, 
which  contributed  to  the  mildness  of  a temporary 
mid-year  slowdown.  For  the  year  &  a whole,  real 
~ 
d The  Jimmy  Carter  Library  does  not  yet  have  available  the 
Presidential  Handwriting  Files  that  contain  material  written  by 
Carter,  including  memoranda  written  to  his  advisers  regarding 
policy  proposals.  The  files  are  not  exaected  to  be  available 
until’Janu&y  1992  at  the  earliest:  Consequently,  this  article 
presents  material  sent  from  Administration  officials and  others 
to  Carter  or  his  advisers.  Some  memos  written  by  Carter’s 
advisers  contained  space  for him  to  check  his  approval  or  dis- 
approval  of a proposal;  these  memos,  if returned  to  and  filed 
by  their  authors,  provide  evidence  of his  position  on  the  pro- 
posed  action.  Sometimes  memos  sent  among  Carter’s  advisers 
summarize  his  position.  Whensuch  memos  are  not  available, 
his  position  must  be  inferred  from  the  historical  record  of  his 
Administration’s  economic  policies. 
GNP  rose  4.9  percent,  the  unemployment  rate 
averaged  7 percent,  and  real  per  capita  disposable 
income  was up  4.9  percent.  Consumer  installment 
credit  outstanding,  which  consists  of most  short-  and 
intermediate-term  credit  extended  to individuals  that 
is scheduled  for repayment  on at least  two  payment 
dates,  grew  19  percent.  The.major  failure  in  the 
economy’s  performance  was the  6.4  percent  annual 
inflation  rate  (December  to  December).i6 
The  economic  expansion  continued  at an uneven 
pace  throughout  1978,  although  the  long-run 
economic  outlook  dimmed.  Inflation  became  the 
country’s  major  economic  concern,  as  the  annual- 
ized  inflation  rate  rose  to  over  9.4  percent  in  the 
second  quarter.  I7 
In  May,  Carter  received  a  letter  from  George 
Meany,  president  of the  AFLCIO,  expressing  con- 
cern  over  the  inflation  problem  and  urging  action: 
The  AFL-CIO  shares  the  concern  that  you  and  [Fed] 
Chairman  Miller  have  expressed  on the  need  to  curb  infla- 
tion:  We  are equally  concerned  about  the  pursuit  of policies 
which  have  repeatedly  led  the  country  down  the  path  of 
recession  and  unemployment.  .  .  . 
.  .  .  [we  urge  you  to  give  serious  consideration  to 
authorizing  the  Federal  Reserve  to  implement  the  Credit 
Control  Act  of 1969  . . . . If you  authorized  the  use  of that 
authority,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  could  exercise  selec- 
tive  credit  regulation  measures.  Such  policies  would  not 
entail  ever-higher  interest  rates,  with  a concentrated  impact 
upon  housing  which  is  in  short  supply,  that  would  bring 
serious  unemployment,  along  with  continued  inflation  in 
housing  prices  and  rents. 
I  believe  that  selective  credit  regulation  offers  a poten- 
tially  useful  alternative  to  the  extremes  of  either  tight 
money/high  interest  rates,  or  wage  and  price  controls, 
which  you  have  wisely  rejected  because  of their  record  of 
failure. is 
Carter  responded  that,  although  he  shared  Meany’s 
concerns,  he  believed  credit  controls  to  be  “ineffi- 
cient,  inequitable  and  costly  to  administer.“19 
Despite  Carter’s  aversion  to  credit  controls,  the 
Administration  was said to have  conducted  an infor- 
mal review  of the  Credit  Control  Act in the  early  fall 
of  1978  to  appease  the  AFLCIO.ZO  In  addition, 
Carter  told  the  United  Steelworkers  in  mid- 
September  that  he would  soon  announce  a new anti- 
inflation  program  that  might  include  voluntary  wage- 
price  standards  .*l  Shortly  after  that,  Meany’s 
preference  for  selective  credit  controls  was  made 
public  by  Th  Was/lington Post.** In  late  October, 
Carter  officially announced  his program.  It consisted 
of the  voluntary  wage  and  price  standards’  to  which 
he had alluded,  along with Federal  spending  restraint 
and regulatory  reform.  Under  the voluntary  standards, 
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one-half  percent  less  than  their  average  rate  of  in- 
crease  over  1976  and  1977.23 
Talk  of credit  controls  continued.  Bamm’s reported 
on  November  13,  1978  Townsend-Greenspan  & 
Co.‘s opinion  on the likelihood  of such controls,  given 
that  the  President  could  implement  the  CCA: 
“At  this  stage,  it  is  difficult  to  envisage  any  major  move 
towards  credit  controls,  certainly  of a rigid  type..  However, 
it is not  inconceivable  to us  that  some  restrictions  on  loans 
for  mergers  and  acquisitions,  and  other,  not  necessarily 
definable  ‘non-productive’  purposes,  could  be  initiated.“z4 
A  few  weeks  later,  on  December  4,  Th  wall 
Stt-iet Journal quoted  Alfred  Kahn,  chairman  of the 
Council  on  Wage  and  Price  Stability  (COWPS),  as 
endorsing  credit  controls  as an  anti-inflation  device 
and  planning  to  raise  the  prospect  of controls  with 
Charles  Schultze,  chairman  of  the  Council  of 
Economic  Advisers  (CEA),  and  G.  William  Miller, 
Federal  Reserve  Board Chairman.  In response  to  Th 
WallStmtJoumal’s  report,  Orin  Kramer,  Associate 
Director  for Housing  and Urban  Development,  sent 
a memo  to  Stuart  Eizenstat,  ‘Carter’s  Assistant  for 
Domestic  Affairs  and  Policy,  warning  that  he 
(Kramer),  Robert.Carswell  of the  Treasury  and Lyle 
Gramley  of  the  CEA,  were  concerned  about  the 
effect  Kahn’s  statement  would  have  on the  financial 
markets  and  thought  that  it  should  be  retracted: 
/W/he&f  of not contr&  are a good idea,  it  is ext7wnely bad 
policy  to  talk  izbout them publicly  before the. Adminrjrration 
&i  made  a jnn  decision to  introduce them.  The  President 
has  standby  authority  to permit  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
to  impose  a wide  range  of credit  controls.  There  is fear  in 
the  business  and  financial  community  that  the  President 
will  use  this  p.ower:  Kahn’s statement,  with  the itnpliiation 
that  the President might consider exer&ing  thris  authority,  will 
induce  some  corporations  and  sophistiicated individuals  to 
accelerate  their bming  out offear  that the ‘window’ wih’ close. 
This  increased bomxoirig  wiil  increase interest rates,  increase 
credit aggrzgata,  andgive  the Feds  hawks an argument to raise 
Fed  rate! &n&r.  If  the  Fed  failed  to  respond  to  higher 
money  market  rates  by  tightening  up,  the  Fed  would  risk 
signalling  ‘weakness’  to  the  international  bankers,  thereby 
jeopardizing  the  strength  of  the  dollar. 
From  Kahn’s  viewpoint,  it would  be best  if he were  to be 
the  one  to indicate  ‘that his statements wempure/y  h@othe&ai, 
and  credit controls are not under active  conrideati~n.  In  any 
event,  thfi should be the Administration’s position-and  quickly, 
befwe  thepmssum  buif&  up.  [emphasis  as  in  original] 
Kramer  also  warned  that  the  desirability  of  credit 
controls  was  “highly  questionable”: 
Beyond  the  obvious  credit  market  distortions  created  by 
controls,  it  is  difficult  to  create  a control  system  which  is 
effective.  For  example,  Kahn  suggested  the  possibility  of 
limiting  the  amount  of time  consumers  have  to  pay  back 
debt  to  discourage  the  use  of  credit  and  reduce  interest 
rates.  The  practical  problem  is that  while  the  Fed  can  limit 
the  terms  on which  banks  extend  credit,  would  such  limita- 
tions  apply  to Sears  and  Roebuck  and  every  retail  merchant 
in  the  country?  Likewise,  it  has  been  privately  suggested 
that  the  Fed  might  prohibit  financial  institutions  from 
extending  credit  to  companies  that  violate  the  wage/price 
guidelines.  The  difficulty  is  that  the  sanction-the  denial 
of credit-could.put  companies  out  of business  or choke  off 
desirable  business  investment.  In short,  the  denial  of credit 
to those  violating  our wage/price  guidelines  probably  consti- 
tutes  overkill.  Most importantly,  ifcmdit  cont&s  were eflective, 
and  credt  demand  in some or a/l  sects  of the economy were 
reduced,  the result  woukf  be to  heaghten the  chances that  our 
sought afrer  ‘sol?  landing’ would  become a  harder  ctzzsh. ,  .  . 
[P]ast  history  with  such  controls  has  usually produced  unin- 
tended  and  undesirable  consequences,  and  the  subject 
should  be  addressed  with  extreme  caution,  if  at  all.25 
[emphasis  as  in  original] 
With  rumors  of credit  and  mandatory  wage-price 
controls  still  circulating,  1978  ended.  For  the  year 
as a whole,  real GNP  grew  4.5  percent,  slightly under 
the  ‘1977 rate,  and  the. inflation  rate  was  9 percent, 
up over  2 percent  from  1977.  The  Board  attributed 
the  behavior  of economic  activity  in part  to the  con- 
tinuing  high  inflation.  The  personal  saving  rate  was 
extremely  low by postwar  standards,  and  consumer 
spending  on  durable  goods  was  strong,  ,perhaps 
because  consumers  anticipated  future  price  rises. 
This  spending  behavior  contributed  to  the  ratio  of 
aggregate  household  indebtedness  to  disposable 
personal  income  reaching  a record  level;  consumer 
installment  credit  outstanding  grew  19.4  percent. 
Business  investment  apparently  slowed  because  of 
the  greater  uncertainty  associated  with  rising  infla- 
tion.z6 The  Board found long-run  economic  prospects 
to be  mixed  and  expected  further  weakening  in con- 
sumer  sentiment.  Consumer  spending  and real GNP 
growth  would  slow accordingly.  Inflationary  pressures 
were  predicted  to  remain  strong.*’ 
Should  the  Credit  Control  Act  Be  Used 
or  Repealed?:  The  1979  Political  Debate 
Debate  over  whether  credit  controls  might  be 
imposed  continued  into  1979.  Financial  analyst  Don 
Conlan  thought  there  was  a  40  percent  chance  of 
credit  controls  being  instituted,  while Bamn’s editor 
Robert  Bleiberg  thought  the’probability  was  60 per- 
cent.28  Throughout  the  first  half  of  the  year,  the 
Senate  debated  bill S.  35,  legislation  introduced.by 
Senator  Jesse  Helms  of North  Carolina  that  would 
have  repealed  the  CCA.  In  addressing  the  Senate 
in January,  Helms  expressed  his opinion  of the  CCA: 
I find  .  .  . that  there  remains  on  the  books  in  the  Federal 
Code  an onerous  piece  of legislation  which  purports  to be a 
means  of “combating  inflation.”  In fact,  it is little  more  than 
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system  of this  country.  I speak  of.  .  . the  Credit  Control  have  to be persuaded  of the  wisdom  of this  action.  [empha- 
Act  of  1969.29  sis  as  in  original] 
On  March  28  Helms  added, 
Only  repeal  of  this  onerous  law  can  quiet  this  unrest  [in 
financial  markets].  Indeed,  failure  to  repeal  the  law  will 
accelerate  speculation  about  control  implementation.  .  .  . 
We  request  your  approval  for us to meet  with  Chairman 
Miller and the  other  members  of the  Federal.Reserve  Board 
to  discuss  these  matters. 
. . .  [An] obvious  objection  to  the  Credit  Control  Act  is 
political.  The  statute  is so loosely  drawn  and  confers  such 
vast  powers  on  the  President  and-through  him-on  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  that  no credit  transactions  would  be 
outside  the  purview  of  this  law,  once  the  authority  is 
invoked  by  the  President.  The  invocation  of virtually  un- 
limited  power  by the  President  is hardly  consistent  with  the 
post-Watergate  mood  .of Congress.  .  .  .30 
Just two days later,  Treasury  Secretary  W. Michael 
Blumenthal  sent  a  memo  to  Carter  urging  him  to 
invoke  the  CCA  and  impose  ‘consumer  credit 
controls: 
Carter  gave  his approval  for preliminary  discussions 
only.31 
Apparently,  the  Administration  was still debating 
use of the CCA in mid-May,  when  Kahn sent a memo 
to Carteis  key  advisers  on credit  controls  as part  of 
an  anti-inflation  strategy: 
It is the  unanimous  opinion  of your  economic  advisors  ‘that 
our  anti-inflation  program  needs  the  strengthening  of  a 
somewhat  more  restrictive  monetary  policy.,  Although 
growth  in the  money  supply  has  been  sluggish  for  several 
months,  banks  have  been  intensively  exploiting  other 
sources  of funds  to  sustain  a very  rapid  rate  of expansion  in 
bank  credit.  In  the  context  of  rising  inflationary  expecta- 
tions,  the  overly-ample  availability  of  credit  is  fueling  a 
business  scramble  for  inventories  and  adding  to  pressures 
on  prices  of  materials. 
It  is  amazing  to  me  how  often  these  [direct  controls  on 
‘credit, especially  consumer  credit]  continue  to be suggested 
from  both  the  right  and  the  left.  I recognize  that  the  case 
for  these  on  short-term  macroeconomic  grounds  is weak: 
it  is  unclear  that  we  need  additional  consumer  credit 
restraint  right  now.  .  .  . 
I think  the  case  is clearer  as part  of a longer-term  policy 
of discouraging  excessive  consumption.  There  is widespread 
public  acceptance  of the  notion  that  consumers  are  taking 
an excessively  cavalier  attitude  toward  incurring  debt,  and 
that  the  government  ought  to  do  something  directly  to 
discourage  it.  Certainly  the  imposition  of  direct  credit 
controls  would  be  widely  perceived  as  a  serious  step  to 
combat  inflation.32 
Your  advisors  also agree  unanimously  that  action  should 
be taken  to limit the  most  liberal terms  on consumer  credit. 
Such  action  would  require  you  to invoke  the  Credit  Control 
Act  of  1969  and  to request  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
take  steps  to  put  consumer  credit  controls  into  effect. 
The  Federal  Reserve  has’been  reluctant  to  increase  re- 
straint  on the  banking  system;  their  analysis  suggests  more 
current  and  potential  weakness  in  the  economy  than  we 
perceive.  Our  concern  is that  much  further  delay  in exer- 
cising  restraint  will permit  and  encourage  a surge  in  both 
business  and  consumer  spending  that  will add  significantly 
to  the  already  poor  prospects  for  prices  in’the  next  few 
months.  .  .  . 
While  the  White  House  debated  implementing 
credit  controls,  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking, 
Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs held  hearings  on  S.  35, 
Helms’s  bill to  repeal  the  CCA,  and  S.  389,  a bill 
introduced  by  Senator  John  Tower,  that  would 
require  the  President  to  report  to  Congress  when 
invoking  the  Act and require  a concurrent  resolution 
by Congress  before  the Fed  implements  the controls. 
Alan  Greenspan,  then  president  of  Townsend- 
Greenspan  &  Co.,  gave  testimony  typical  of those 
favoring  repeal: 
Given  the  Board’s  reluctance  to  take  the  initiative  in 
restricting  credit  growth,  it will be important  that  we convey 
not  only  our  concern,  but  yours  as  well.  .  .  . 
A useful  adjunct  to a tightening  of monetary  policy  would 
be  to  impose  a  modest  tightening.  of  terms  on  consumer 
credit.  Since  the  effects  of  such  controls  on  consumer 
spending  are  uncertain,  a  heavy-handed  action  would  be 
inadvisable.  Putting  limits  on  the  terms  of  credit  can  be 
justified,  however,.  because  competitive  pressures  are 
’ pushing,lenders  to move  steadily  toward  moie’liberal  terms. 
In the  process,  some  consumers  may be overextending  their 
debt  positions  to  an extent  that  is not  desirable.  Our tenta- 
tive thinking is to limit  the maximum  matu$y  on new car ioqns 
to. 42 mqnths,  and  to inqease  the minimum  month/y fqpayment 
on revolving cr&t  (charge  car&  to 10  percent of the outstanding 
balance att&utab/e  to new  Loam. [emphasis  added] 
The  Credit  Control.  Act  of  1969  permits  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  to  impose  such  controls  on  your  authori- 
Curbing  the  growth  of credit  expansion  is, in my  view,  the 
key  to  defusing  the  strong  underlying  inflationary  forces 
which  threaten  the  stability  of  our  economy.  However, 
rationing  credit  through  statute  or regulation  is unlikely  to 
be  successful  and  to  the  extent  that  it  is,  would  probably 
allocate  credit  in  an  undesirable  manner.33 
Witnesses  testifying  for the  Administration  and the 
Board,  however,  wanted  to retain  standby  authority 
for credit  controls.  For  example,  a letter  from  CEA 
chairman  Charles  Schultze  to  Senator  Proxmire  was 
presented  as  evidence  at  the  hearing;  It  read, 
[R]epeal  of [the CCA]  would  not  be in the  national  interest. 
The  authority.  . . is very  broad  and  general.  At the  same 
time,  the  language  of  the  Act  provides  safeguards  that 
would  effectively  prevent  it from being  used  in inappropriate 
ways.  First,  the Act specifically provides  that  the  President’s 
authority  is limited  to  cases  in which  inflation  is generated 
by  an  excessive  volume  of credit.  .  :  . 
30  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1990 Although  the  authority  granted  in  that  Act  has  been  in 
existence  for ten  years,  no Administration  has  sought  to use 
it, and properly  so, in my judgment.  The  sources  of inflation 
during  the  past  decade  have  been  many  and  varied.  .  .  . 
Nevertheless,  there  has  been  no  time  in  the  past  decade 
when  the  expansion  of  credit  could  not  have  been  con- 
trolled  appropriately  by  the  more  general  instruments  of 
monetary  policy.  .  .  . 
Under  almost  all conditions,  selective  credit  controls  are 
not  a  substitute  for  the  general  instruments  of  monetary 
policy,  nor,  indeed,  can  these  two  types  of  instruments 
complement  one  another  effectively.  But one  can  certainly 
conceive  of circumstances  in which  resort  to selective  credit 
controls  might  be  necessary.  .  .  .  [W]e  might  find  that 
strong  inflationary  pressures  were  being  generated  by  a 
substantial  relaxation  of terms  on consumer  credit,  and  that 
the  resulting  increase  in  consumer  borrowing  was  threat- 
ening  to put  many  consumers  in a precarious  financial  posi- 
tion,  as well  as to  heat  up  inflation.  . . . A similar  need  for 
selective  controls  might  arise  if inflation  were  being  gener- 
ated  by a wave of credit-financed  scare buying  by consumers 
because  of threatening  international  developments,  as was 
the  case  immediately  following  the  beginning  of the  Korean 
war.34 
The  Board’s  stand  on the  CCA  was similar to the 
Treasury’s.  Federal  Reserve  Board  governor  Nancy 
Teeters  presented  the  Board’s position  to the  Bank- 
ing  Committee: 
Credit  controls  as an  instrument  of anti-inflationary  policy 
have  most  appeal  at times  when  fiscal and monetary  policies 
cannot,  for  one  reason  or  another,  be  employed  flexibly. 
During  World  War  II and  for  a while  thereafter,  monetary 
policy was constrained  by a pledge  to maintain  a low interest 
rate  on  U.S.  Treasury  securities.  As  a result,  the  Federal 
Reserve  could  not effectively  control  growth  in the  monetary 
and  credit  aggregates  since  it had  to  supply  as much  bank 
reserves  as  needed  to  maintain  an  unchanged  level  of 
interest  rates.  Regulating  nonrate  terms  of credit  extensions 
seemed  to be one  of the  few ways  to discourage  borrowing 
in  such  an  environment.  Thus,  regulations  limiting  con- 
sumer  credit  were  used  on  three  occasions  in this  period. 
.  .  . 
.  .  .  . If credit  controls  are  to  be  used,  it would  require 
circumstances  when  the  need  is  clear  and  obvious-a 
national  emergency,  such  as  war,  or  a  clearly  perceived 
imbalance  in  the  distribution  of  available  credit.  .  .  . 
Selective  credit  controls  might  be  effective  in  holding 
down  a narrow  category  of spending  and might  be appropri- 
ate  if  there  were  shortages  of  particular  goods,  such  as 
automobiles  and other  consumer  durable  goods  during World 
War  II.  However,  even  if such  shortages  occurred,  rationing 
or  excise  taxes  might  be  a  more  effective  and  equitable 
means  of  treating  the  problem.  .  .  . 
.  .  .  [A]  large  bureaucracy  would  probably  have  to  be 
created  to administer  controls.  In the  absence  of a national 
consensus  as  to  their  necessity,  detection  of  violations 
would  depend  almost  entirely  on the  regulators,  since  both 
the  borrowers  and  the  lenders  may  have  an  incentive  to 
circumvent  the  controls.  Regulatory  staff  also  would  be 
needed  to decide  on exemptions  to the  controls,  as obvious 
inequities  arose.  Their  cost  also  would  include  the  paper- 
work  and  compliance  burden  borne  by the  lenders  and  the 
borrowers.  These  direct  costs  would  likely  escalate  with 
the  duration  of  the  controls  as  they  were  extended  to 
counter  the  ingenuity  of  the  private  sector.  .  .  . 
All these  factors  suggest  that  under  most  circumstances 
policies  other  than  credit  controls  would  have  superior 
results  with  fewer  undesirable  side  effects.  .  .  . 
There  may  be  situations  in the  future,  however,  in which 
mandatory  credit  controls  could  be  a useful  component  of 
national  economic  policy.  One  such  circumstance  could 
occur  if it were  necessary  to  undertake  a major  and  rapid 
redirection  of resource  allocation  in response  to  a national 
emergency,  like  an  outbreak  of war.  .  .  . 
The  Credit  Control  Act  of  1969  is useful  to  the  extent 
that  it provides  a means  for dealing  with  such  contingencies 
promptly.  .  .  . 
.  .  .  .  Thus,  if the  act  is  to  be  retained,  the  changes 
suggested  by  S.  389  would  seem  unwise.  .  .  . 
The  Federal  Reserve  position  is basically  that  it sees  no 
reason  to  repeal  it.35 
Neither  S. 3.5 nor  S. 389  ever  reached  the  Senate 
floor,  and  Carter  did  not  invoke  the  CCA  then, 
although  a May  1979  Gallup  poll found  most  of the 
public  supporting  government  control  programs.36 
By October,  the  economy  was well  on  its way  to 
attaining  an  annual  inflation  rate  of  13.3  percent 
(measured  by  the  change  in  the  consumer  price 
index,  December  to  December).s7  On  October  6, 
the  Board  announced  several  policy  actions.3* First, 
a shift  in operating  methods  was  undertaken.  The 
Board  in conducting  monetary  policy  would  in the 
future  focus  less on controlling  the  federal  funds  rate 
and  more  on  controlling  bank  reserves.  Second,  it 
raised  the  discount  rate,  the  rate  at  which  it  lends 
funds  to  commercial  banks,  from  11 percent  to  12 
percent.  Third,  the  Board  imposed  upon  domestic 
member  banks  and branches  and agencies  of foreign 
banks  a marginal  reserve  requirement  of 8 percent 
on  increases  in  their  managed  liabilities  above  a 
specified  base.  The  managed  liabilities subject  to the 
reserve  requirement  were  time  deposits  of $100,000 
and  over  with  maturities  of  less  than  one  year, 
Eurodollar  borrowings,  repurchase  agreements 
against  U.S.  government  and  federal  agency 
securities,  and  federal  funds  borrowings  from 
nonmember  institutions.  Because  such  managed 
liabilities  financed  approximately  50  percent  of the 
growth  in bank  credit  between  June  and  October, 
they  were  viewed  as  contributing  to  the  inflation 
problem,  even  though  they  attracted  credit  mainly 
from  other  uses.  When  the  reserve  requirement  was 
imposed,  member  banks  were  estimated  to  be 
holding  $240  billion  in  managed  liabilities.e 
e The  Board  previously  imposed  supplemental  marginal  reserve 
requirements  on  managed  liabilities  in  1973.  Its  objective  was 
to curb credit  growth  and moderate  inflationary  pressures  without 
inducing  tight  credit  conditions.  Non-member  banks  were 
asked  to cooperate  with  the program  by holding  special marginal 
reserves  themselves.  The  supplemental  requirements  were 
gradually  lifted.  See  FederalReseme  BulLetin, vol.  59,  no.  5 (May 
1973)  pp.  375-376. 
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the  rapid  growth  rates  of  money  and  credit 
throughout  1979,  the  rise  in  inflation  and  upward 
revisions  in  inflationary  expectations,  and  the 
speculative  activity  in  the  markets  for  gold,  silver, 
and other  commodities.39  According  to Paul Volcker, 
Chairman  of the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  the  actions 
were  to  signal  an  “unwillingness  to  finance  an  ac- 
celerating  rate  of  inflation.“40 
Events  in  Early  1980 
Preceding  Carter’s  Action 
Concern  over  the  record  inflation  rates  and  the 
threat  of recession  made  the  economy  a dominant 
issue  in  the  1980  presidential  campaign.  The  year 
began  with  Senator  Edward  Kennedy  predicted  to 
be  Carter’s  major  opponent  for  the  Democratic 
nomination.  Kennedy,  unlike  Carter,  endorsed  the 
use  of mandatory  wage  and price  controls.  In a cam- 
paign  speech  on  January  28,  Kennedy  said, 
The  time  has  come  for  a frank  admission  that  under  this 
President,  the  voluntary  guidelines  have  run  their  course 
and  failed. 
Inflation  is  out  of  control.  There  is  only  one  recourse: 
the  President  should  impose  an immediate  six month  freeze 
on  inflation-followed  by  mandatory  controls,  as  long  as 
necessary,  across  the  board-not  only on prices  and  wages, 
but  also  on  profits,  dividends,  interest  rates,  and  rent.4i 
The  public  seemed  to  share  Kennedy’s  position.’ 
A  mid-January  N?w  York  Times/CBS  News  poll 
showed  that “6.5 percent  of adult Americans  were  will- 
ing.to  ‘have  the  Government  enforce  limits  on both 
wage  and price  increases’  to slow the  inflation rate.“42 
By  mid-February  inflation  data  was  available  for 
January.  The  producer  price  index  for finished  goods 
rose  at  an  annual  rate  of  19  percent,  and  the  CPI 
climbed  18  percent  .43 On  February  15,  the  Fed 
raised  the  discount  rate  from  12 to  13 percent.44  The 
markets  responded  quickly.  Banks  raised  the  prime 
rate  to  1S3/  percent  .45 Precious  metals  prices  fell, 
while  financial  futures  prices  rose.46 
Also  on  February  15,  T’e Nm  York Times  quoted 
Alfred  Kahn  as  saying  that  the  Administration  was 
considering  the  use of selective  credit  controls.  Kahn, 
who  opposed  wage  and  price  controls,  favored 
Regulation  W-type  restrictions  on  loan  downpay- 
f Leonard  Silk,  “Uncertainty  on Controls,”  Th  New  Yod  Times, 
February  2’2, 1980.  Silk reports  that  Kennedy’s  position  did  not 
contribute  much  to his  popular  support.  Although  Kennedy  was 
the  only presidential  candidate  favoring  wage  and price  controls, 
survey  results  found  that  62 percent  of-the  public  was  unaware 
of his position,  while  8 percent  believed  that  he opposed  controls. 
ments  and  maturities.47  Four  days  later,  Kahn, 
Eizenstat,  and  White  House  Staff  Director  Al 
McDonald  sent  a  memo  to  Carter  stating  that 
[i]t is  essential  that  we  move  again  onto  the  offensive  on 
the  inflation  front.  The  economic  situation  is  critical  and 
the  public  recognizes  this.  Working  against  us  are  the 
continuing  bad  reports,  the  growing  support  for  controls, 
widening  business  assumptions  that  high  inflation  is with  us 
indefinitely  and  public  expectations  that  increased  defense 
spending  will  fuel  it  more. 
To  date  the  public  has  been  reasonably  understanding  of 
your  position.  They  recognize  that  you  are  not  to  blame 
for  the  high  inflation  rate,  but  they  correctly  demand  to 
know  what  you  plan  to  do  about  it.  As  soon  as  the  inter- 
national  crisis  recedes,  this  will  be  the  nation’s  number 
one  preoccupation. 
We  have  no  time  to  lose.  We  must  move  out  forcefully 
and  visibly  to  reinforce  the  importance  of  the  voluntary 
effort  and  to reemphasize  your  priority  to  bring  this  aspect 
of  the  economy  under  control.48 
On  February  21,  Henry  Kaufman,  economist  and 
general  partner  at  Salomon  Brothers,  suggested 
restrictions  on bank  credit  growth  as part  of a seven 
point  plan  to  reduce  inflation.49 
Talk  of control  programs  heated  up  in  Congress 
in late  February.  Mandatory  wage-price  controls  had 
vocal  support.  Nevertheless,  they  were  unlikely  to 
receive  congressional  authorization;  Democratic 
Senator  Bennett  Johnston  threatened  to filibuster  any 
Senate  effort  to enact  such  legislation.s0  Support  for 
credit  controls  was  somewhat  stronger,  primarily 
because  the CCA  allowed for their  imposition  without 
congressional  consultation  or approval.  The  Admini- 
stration  feared,  as  did  many  in  Congress,  that  the 
mere  request  for  authorization  of  wage  and  price 
controls  would  induce  firms  to  borrow  heavily  and 
increase  prices  in  anticipation  of future  restrictions 
on  their  ability  to  do  so.  In fact,  rumors  that  credit 
controls  might  be  imposed  were  having  the  same 
effect.  A  report  in  Th  Wah’ Street Journal on  such 
borrowing  activity  quoted  Donald  DeLuca,  treasurer 
of Pittsburgh-based  Copperweld  Corp.,  as saying that 
“he  could  ‘smell’  credit  controls  coming.  He  .  .  . 
phoned  his  New  York  bankers  to  accelerate  agree- 
ment  on  a  $50  million  revolving  credit.“51 
The  issue  of  credit  controls  arose  again  on 
February  ‘25, when  Chairman  Volcker  was on Capitol 
Hill giving his semi-annual  report  on monetary  policy 
as required  by the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act.  Volcker 
was  perceived  as a forceful  opponent  of credit  con- 
trols,  arguing  that  credit  was already  slowing  because 
of general  market  conditions  and  the  restrictive  ac- 
tions  the  Fed  had taken.52  While  testifying,  Volcker 
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tion  on  selective  credit  controls.  The  following  ex- 
change  ensued: 
Volcker:  ‘&.  . . . I just  don’t  know  how  they  would  be  work- 
able.  .  . . I m  no  enthusiast  of using  direct  controls  in this 
area  and  think  they  can  be  counterproductive  in  that  they 
lead  to  anticipation  of inability  to raise  money  and  thereby 
actually  increase  demand.” 
Proxmire:  “Then  you are opposed  to invoking  the  Credit 
Control  Act which  is on the  books  now which  the  President 
could  of  course  invoke?  .  .  .” 
Volcker:  “Yes.“s3 
The  Federal  Reserve  nevertheless  chose  to 
cooperate  with  the  Administration.  Volcker  met  with 
Carter  on  February  20  and  24.g  After  these  meet- 
ings,  on February  28,  Carter  received  a memo  from 
Treasury  Secretary  G.  William  Miller  outlining  pos- 
sible components  of the  intensified  anti-inflation  pro- 
gram  under  discussion.  s4 The  memo  listed  several 
options  to  restrain  credit  growth: 
The  Federal  Reserve  is  considering  actions  which  it  will 
take  independently  (but  with  coordinated  timing)  to  rein- 
force  credit  restraint  consistent  with  already  announced 
targets.  These  will be  within  the  general  framework  of the 
October  6 actions,  but,  to  the  extent  feasible,  designed  to 
maximize  “awailabiky”  rather  than  “interest  rate”  effects. 
They  could  include: 
1.  Action  to  tighten  existing  marginal  reserve  require- 
ments  on liability expansion.  These  requirements,  im  osed 
in  October,  are  not  “binding”  on  most  banks  now. R 
2.  A more  visible  program  of voluntary  credit  restraint, 
with  reporting  requirements,  aimed  primarily,  but  not 
entirely,  at banks.  This  program  will emphasize  restraint  on 
total  lending,  but  with  special  accommodation  of  small 
business  and  mortgage  lending  to  the  extent  feasible. 
Emphasis  would  be  placed  on  discouraging  “take-over”  or 
“speculative”  financing. 
Also described  in the memo  were  several  actions  that 
the  Board might  take  if the CCA  were  invoked,  along 
with  the  pros  and  cons  of  each: 
JT]he  Federal  Reserve  would  constrain  credit  not  tied  to 
autos,  home  repairs,  or mobile  homes  . .  . by  a system  of 
special  reserve  requirements  of  say,  10  percent,  on  any 
increase  in  outstanding  amounts. 
g According  to the  Presidential  Diary  Office  Files  at the  Jimmy 
Carter  Library,  the  latter  meeting,  which  concerned  the 
economy,  lasted  just  under  two  hours  and  was  also attended  by 
Energy  Secretary  Charles  Duncan,  Jr.,  Stuart  Eizenstat,  Alfred 
Kahn,  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  Director  James 
McIntyre,  Jr.,  G.  William  Miller,  Press  Secretary  Jody  Powell, 
Charles  Schultze,  and  the  First  Lady.  See  President’s  Daily 
Diary,  “Z/24/80 Backup Material,”  Box PD-73,  Presidential  Diary 
Office,  Jimmy  Carter  Library. 
h See  Section  VI  below  for  a discussion  of the  effectiveness  of 
the  Board’s October  6 marginal  reserve  requirements  on managed 
liabilities. 
Pm  Restraint  on  growth  of  consumer  credit  would 
directly  carry  the  message  to  the  American  public  of  the 
need  for restraint.  Many  credit  card  issuers  might  welcome 
official sanction  for pulling  back  from  business  that  is cur- 
rently  unprofitable,  and  there  could  be  minor  effects  on 
consumer  saving. 
Con: The  Federal  Reserve  Board considers  such  action  of 
relatively  little  importance  substantively  (depending  on 
coverage,  only $70  to $200  billion  of credit  is involved  and 
borrowing  would  take  different  forms.)’  It would  be admini- 
stratively  highly  cumbersome  because  tens  of thousands  of 
individual  lenders  are  involved  (many  of which  would  have 
to  be  exempted).ss 
The  Board,  however,  did  not  suggest  to  the  Ad- 
ministration  the  use  of consumer  credit  controls.56 
Internal  Fed  memos  confirm  that  the  Board  was 
preparing  to  undertake  the  actions  described  in 
Miller’s  correspondence.  The  dates  and  content  of 
the  memos  suggest  that  the  Board  made  the  major 
decisions  regarding  which  actions  to  take  during 
February  and  had  decided  on  all but  a few  details 
of  its  program  by  March  5.  Actions  that  could  be 
undertaken  without  the  CCA  appear  to  have  been 
planned  for at the  Board’s own  initiative,  rather  than 
at the  Administration’s  request.  Where  the  initiative 
for  the  other  actions  originated  is  unclear.57 
Word  began  spreading  during  the  first  week  of 
March  about  the  anti-inflation  program  the  Admini- 
stration  was considering.  Media  attention  turned  away 
from  whether  credit  controls  would  be  imposed  and 
toward  what  form they  would take.  Although  business 
borrowing  accounted  for  the  bulk  of  total  credit 
growth,  the consensus  view was that  businesses  could 
too  easily  evade  credit  controls  through  use  of the 
bond  and  commercial  paper  markets,  making  con- 
trols  on  consumer  credit  more  practical.  A  Wash- 
ington  specialist  at  an  investment  firm  was  quoted 
as saying  that  Volcker  “ ‘may  be  prepared  to  acqui- 
esce  on  consumer  measures  in  return  for  Carter’s 
people  staying  out  of his hair on commercial  lending 
restraints.’  ‘3* 
The  possibility  of consumer  credit  controls  did not 
please  bankers,  who  publicly  expressed  their  con- 
cern.  The  N~~QJ  Yo&  Times  quoted  a  Citibank 
newspaper  advertisement  as  reading  “ ‘There  may 
be  policy  makers  who  believe  this  [credit  controls] 
to  be  in the  national  interest  but  it is doubtful  that 
many  citizens  will  find  it  to  be  in  theirs.’  “59 Less 
than  a week  earlier,  though,  the  Administration  had 
i With  credit  for  automobiles  and  housing  excluded  from  a 
control  program,  only  about  a quarter  of total  consumer  credit 
would  be  subject  to  regulation. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  33 received  telephone  calls from senior executives  at two 
of the  country’s  largest  banks,  stating  that  their  banks 
“would  be adversely  affected  by consumer  credit  con- 
trols.  However,  both  agreed  that the financial markets 
(bond  markets)  expect  and  would  react  favorably” 
to such controls.60 And  on March  6, Carter’s  counsel, 
Lloyd  Cutler,  forwarded  to Carter’s  key  advisers  ex- 
cerpts  from  a memd  he  had  received  from  “the  head 
of  one  of  our  largest  financial  institutions.”  The 
banker  argued  for mandatory  restrictions  on the  an- 
nual  growth  rate  of consumer  credit,  except  credit 
for housing  and automobiles.  Such  restrictions  closely 
resembled  the  voluntary  restrictions  that  the  Board 
was  considering.61 
By Monday,  March  10, information  was circulating 
regarding  meetings  the  Carter  Administration  had 
held  with  congressional  leaders  to discuss  the  Presi- 
dent’s  economic  policy.  Carter  was  said  to  be  plan- 
ning  a  program  whose  economic  costs  would  be 
borne  primarily  by consumers.  Bank  and  retail credit 
cards  and checking  account  overdrafts  were  rumored 
to be  likely  targets  of a control  program.  The  Board 
was  thought  to  be  preparing  Regulation  W-type 
restrictions  that  would  set  minimum  downpayments 
and maximum  maturities,  limit the  size of credit  lines, 
and perhaps  reduce  grace  periods.jp62 Administration 
sources  also  hinted  at  a  possible  tightening  of  the 
marginal  reserve  requirement  on managed  liabilities. 
A program  with  rigid  quantitative  restrictions  on the 
amounts  of  various  types  of  credit  extended  was, 
however,  definitely  ruled  out  by both  the  Board  and 
the  White  House.63 
The  markets  did  not  respond  well  to this  news  as 
traders  upped  their  expectations  of a recession  in the 
near  future.  Precious  metals  prices,  which  had begun 
falling three  weeks  earlier,  all fell sharply,  as did other 
commodities  prices,  while  financial  futures  prices 
rose.64 
Economic  data  released  March  10  did  not  help 
matters.  The  Fed  announced  that  all  major  com- 
ponents  of  consumer  credit  grew  more  slowly  in 
January  than  December,  with  consumer  installment 
credit  growing  at an annual  rate  of 5.3  percent.  For 
January  and  December  combined,  the  installment 
credit  growth  rate  was  the  lowest  since  the  expan- 
sion  began  in  1975.  These  credit  conditions  were 
accompanied  by  the  first  decline  in  retail  sales  in 
four  months.  Commerce  Department  data  showed 
February’s  retail  sales  0.7  percent  lower  than 
January’s.65 
j Recall  that  the  memo  from  Treasury  Secretary  Blumenthal  to 
Carter  in March  1979 recommended  credit  controls  of this  form. 
On  March  12,  Treasury  Secretary  G.  William 
Miller  sent.Carter  a memo  consisting  of a checklist 
of policies  that  could  be part  of the  President’s  fourth 
anti-inflation  program.  66  That  afternoon,  Carter  held 
a meeting  with  his  advisers  in the  Cabinet  Room.67 
Carter  chose  to invoke  the  CCA  to control  consumer 
revolving  credit  (except  credit  for  home  mortgages 
and automobiles),  credit  extensions  by depository  and 
non-depository  financial  intermediaries,  and  the 
managed  liabilities  of banks  that  were  not  members 
of the  Fed.  Reporting  by  affected  institutions  would 
be  required. 
On  Friday,  March  14, Th  Nm  York Times  reported 
the  opinions  of  several  economists  regarding  con- 
sumer  credit  controls.68  Otto  Eckstein,  a  Harvard 
professor  and  president  of  Data  Resources  Inc., 
described  such  controls  as “ ‘a symbolic  gesture.’  ” 
Henry  Kaufman  thought  the  controls  would  have “ ‘at 
best  .  .  . some  marginal  impact.’  ” S.  Lees  Booth, 
economist  and  senior  vice  president  of the  National 
Consumer  Finance  Association,  wondered  why  con- 
trols  would  be  placed  on  consumer  credit,  which  is 
a small  part  of total  credit  in the  economy.  Another 
economist,  former  Board  Chairman  Arthur  Burns, 
spent  March  14 testifying  before  the  Senate  Bank- 
ing  Committee,  at  which  time  he  gave  his  opinion 
of  the  CCA: 
I think  it’s one  of the  worst  pieces  of legislation  ever  written 
by  the  Congress.  I  hope  that  you  [Sen.  Proxmire]  .  .  . 
would  think  seriously  about  having  the  piece  of legislation 
rescinded.@ 
At  4:30  p.m.  that  day,  in  the  East  Room  of the 
White  House,  Carter  made  a  prepared  statement 
announcing  the  fourth  anti-inflation  program  of his 
presidency,  and  issued  Executive  Order  12201  in- 
voking  the  CCA.‘O 
V. 
ANATOMY  OF THE 1980 
CREDIT  RESTRAINT  PROGRAM 
An  Overview  of  the  Board’s 
Credit  Restraint  Program 
In  his  address  from  the  White  House  on 
March  14, Carter  announced  his imposition  of credit 
controls  under  the  CCA: 
Just  as  our  governments  have  been  borrowing  to  make 
ends  meet,  so have  individual  Americans.  But when  we  try 
to  beat  inflation  with  borrowed  money,  we  just  make  the 
problem  worse. 
Inflation  is fed  by  credit-financed  spending.  Consumers 
have  gone  into  debt  too  heavily.  The  savings  rate  in  our 
nation  is  now  the  lowest  in  more  than  25  years.  .  .  . 
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control  money  and  credit  expansion  are  a basic  part  of the 
fight on inflation.  But  in present  circumstances,  those  tools 
need  to  be  reinforced  so  that  effective  restraint  can  be 
achieved  in  ways  that  spread  the  burden  reasonably  and 
fairly. 
I am therefore  using  my power  under  the  Credit  Control 
Act  of  1969  to  authorize  the  Federal  Reserve  to  impose 
new  restraints  on  the  growth  of  credit  on  a  limited  and 
carefully  targeted  basis.” 
Executive  Order  12201,  invoking  the  CCA,  stated 
that  the  credit  controls  would  be  “in  effect  for  an 
indefinite  period  of  time  and  until  revoked  by  the 
President.“72 Carter’s  political advisers hoped  that the 
anti-inflation  program  would  be  accepted  by  the 
public,  thus  giving  the  President  an advantage  over 
the  other  presidential  contenders  for the  Democratic 
nomination.73 
After  Carter  announced  his  economic  program, 
Volcker  introduced  the  Board’s  Credit  Restraint 
Program  (CRP): 
[T]he  Federal  Reserve  has  . . . taken  certain  further  actions 
to reinforce  the  effectiveness  of the  measures  announced  in 
October  of  1979.  .  .  . 
One  consequence  of strong  demands  for money  and credit 
generated  in part  by inflationary  forces  and  expectations  has 
been  to bring heavy  pressure  on credit  and financial markets 
generally,  with  varying  impacts  on particular  sectors  of the 
economy.  At the  same  time,  restraint  on growth  in money 
and  credit  must  be  a fundamental  part  of  the  process  of 
restoring  stability.  That  restraint  is,  and  will  continue  to 
be,  based  primarily  on  control  of bank  reserves  and  other 
traditional  instruments  of monetary  policy.  However,  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  also believes  the  effectiveness  and 
speed  with  which  appropriate  restraint  can  be  achieved 
without  disruptive  effects on credit  markets  will be facilitated 
by a more  formal program  of voluntary  restraint  by important 
financial  intermediaries  .  .  .  .74 
As  Board  Vice  Chairman  Schultz  later  said  of  the 
program, 
. . . [T]he  overspending  in the  economy,  .  .  . if there  are 
excesses,  appears  to have been  on the  Government  side and 
on  the  consumer  side  in  terms  of  open-end  credit.  .  .  . 
So,  are  we  going  to  slow  this  economy  down.  .  .  ? The 
answer  to  that  is yes;  I  think  we  must.75 
The  Board’s  program  consisted  of  six restrictive 
measures: 
1.  a voluntary  credit  restraint  program  under  which 
all  domestic  commercial  banks,  bank  holding 
companies,  finance  companies,  and  U.S.  agen- 
cies and branches  of foreign  banks  were  expected 
to  limit  their  total  annual  loan  growth 
2.  a special  deposit  requirement  of  15 percent  for 
all lenders  on  increases  in  certain  types  of con- 





an increase  from  8 percent  to  10 percent  in the 
marginal  reserve  requirement  on managed  liabili- 
ties  of  large  banks 
a special  deposit  requirement  of  10 percent  on 
the  additions  to  the  managed  liabilities  held  by 
non-member  banks 
a special  deposit  requirement  of  15 percent  on 
any  additional  assets  held  by  money  market 
mutual  funds 
a surcharge  on  the  discount  window  borrowings 
of  large  banks. 
The  special deposit  requirements  were  simply reserve 
requirements  applied  to  institutions  not  otherwise 
subject  to  such  regulation.  For  example,  the  special 
deposit  requirement  on  consumer  credit  mandated 
that  lenders  hold  15  cents  with  the  Fed  as  non- 
interest-bearing  reserves  for each  dollar of consumer 
credit  extended  over  some  predetermined  amount. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Act grants  the  authority  for 
actions  3 and 6, while the  CCA  confers  authority  for 
the  others.k  Failure  to  comply  with  the  regulations 
could  result  in a maximum  civil  penalty  of  $1,000 
(12  USC  1908),  and  a  maximum  criminal  penalty 
of  $1,000  and  a  year  in jail  (12  USC  1909).  The 
Board  informed  the  public  of  these  potential 
penalties.76 
The  CRP  bore  little  resemblance  to  the  credit 
controls  imposed  previously  and  described  in  Sec- 
tion  II.  Consequently,  a more  detailed  description 
of the program’s  components  is warranted  before  pro- 
ceeding  to  analyze  its  effects. 
The  Voluntary  Credit  Restraint  Program 
The  first  component  of  the  Board’s  program 
restricted  total  loan  growth  by  affected  financial 
institutions  (primarily  banks)  to a range  of 6 percent 
to  9 percent  over  the  period  from  December  1979 
to  December  1980.  Other  lenders,  not  specified  in 
the  program,  were  also requested  to participate.  To 
monitor  the  program,  the  Board  required  affected 
institutions  to file reports  of lending  activity  besides 
those  normally  required.  All  affected  lenders  with 
total  assets of at least $1 billion filed monthly  reports. 
Into  this  category  fell  170  domestic  commercial 
banks,  139  U.S.  branches  and  agencies  of  foreign 
banks,  161  domestic  affiliates  of bank  holding  com- 
panies,  and  15  finance  companies.77  In  addition, 
banks  with  assets  totalling  at least  $300  million  but 
k Board  of  Governors,  Press  Release,  March  14,  1980.  The 
inclusion  of finance  companies  in action  1 required  the  CCA. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  3.5 less than  $1 billion filed quarterly  reports,  and smaller 
banks  were  exempt  from  the filing requirement.  The 
base  over  which  loan  growth  was  calculated  was  the 
average  for December  1979  for banks  that  normally 
filed weekly  reports  with  the  Fed,  the  average  from 
the  November  and  December  reports  for  finance 
companies  that  typically  reported  monthly,  and  the 
level  as of December  3 1 for non-member  banks.  All 
reports  were  filed  with  the  lenders’  district  Federal 
Reserve  Banks. 7* 
The  6 percent  to 9 percent  growth  range  for total 
bank  lending  was  thought  to be  consistent  with  the 
announced  target  ranges  for growth  of the  monetary 
aggregates.  The  9  percent  upper  bound  was  con- 
siderably  lower  than  the  growth  rate  of 13 % percent 
for the  previous  year,  December  to December,  and 
the  accelerated  rate  of  1  73/4 percent  for January  and 
February  of  1980.79 According  to  the  Board,  these 
growth  rates 
could  not  continue  without  threatening  achievement  of the 
restrained  growth  in  money  and  credit  in  1980  which  was 
deemed  necessary  to  help  curb  inflation.  .  .  .  [A] supple- 
mental  program  to restrain  loan growth  seemed  appropriate, 
so  long  as  the  burden  of the  restraint  did  not  fall on  those 
classes  of borrowers  least  able  to  bear  itW 
No  quantitative  rules  were  given  for how  lenders 
should  allocate  available  credit.  Rather,  the  Board 
simply  set  forth  a few  broad  qualitative  guidelines. 
It  discouraged  banks  from  making  unsecured  loans 
to  consumers,  financing  corporate  takeovers  or 
mergers,  lending  for  speculative  purposes  (e.g. 
speculative  purchases  of  commodities  or  precious 
metals),  and  approving  back-up  credit  lines  in sup- 
port  of  credit  raised  with  commercial  paper.  In 
contrast,  funding  for  small  businesses,  farmers, 
homebuyers,  and  automobile  buyers  and  dealers  was 
strongly  encouraged.  81  Board  Vice  Chairman 
Frederick  Schultz  explained, 
. . . [T]he  Board  expects  that,  in setting  interest  rates  and 
other  lending  terms  banks  will, where  possible,  take  account 
of  the  special  needs  of these  borrowers.  .  .  . 
, . . Large  businesses  are  on  notice  that  they  should  not 
turn  to the  commercial  paper  market  to replace  other  credit, 
as such  a shift  would  reduce  the  residual  credit  available  for 
other  borrowers. 
. . . [T]hese  measures  can  not  prevent  small,  and  indeed 
all, businesses  from encountering  strains  in coming  monthssz 
Lenders  were  expected  to  ensure  a continued  flow 
of credit  to borrowers  without  access  to other  forms 
of  financing.  The  Board  required  reports  on  such 
activities  to monitor  the  lenders’  progress  and would 
consult  with  those  whose  efforts  were  inadequate. 
Further,  the  nation’s  36.5 nonfinancial  corporations 
with  at least  $30  million  of outstanding  commercial 
paper  or  total  annual  revenue  of  at  least  $2  billion 
filed  monthly  reports  on  their  commercial  paper 
issues  and  their  foreign  borrowings.83 
Consumer  Credit  Restraint 
To  restrain  consumer  credit  growth,  the  Board 
imposed  a special  deposit  requirement  (SDR)  on all 
increases  in  certain  types  of consumer  credit.  The 
SDR  required  that  lenders  hold with  the  Fed  in non- 
interest-bearing  accounts  reserves  equal  to  15 per- 
cent  of the  amount  of consumer  credit  extended  over 
the  amount  of covered  consumer  credit  outstanding 
on  March  14,  1980.’  Credit  subject  to  the  SDR 
included  all open-end  credit,  secured  or unsecured, 
and  closed-end  consumer  credit  either  unsecured  or 
secured  by  collateral  not  purchased  with  the  credit. 
Open-end  credit  consisted  of credit  card,  bank  over- 
draft  and  revolving  credit.m  For  calculating  the 
required  deposit,  all open-end  credit  was  presumed 
to  be  used  for  non-business  purposes.  Closed-end 
credit  included  unsecured  personal  loans,  loans  for 
which  the  borrower  already  owned  the  collateral, 
travel  and  entertainment  card  plans,  retail  merchant 
credit,  and  credit  secured  by  financial  assets  other 
than  savings  deposits.  Thus,  car,  mobile  home,  and 
mortgage  loans  were  exempt  from  the  SDR  because 
the  proceeds  of the  loans  financed  the  purchase  of 
the  car  or  home.84 
Any lender  extending  at least  $2 million in covered 
credit  was  subject  to the  regulation.  The  $2  million 
cut-off  exempted  1.7 million  retail  firms  and  36,595 
other  firms from  the  SDR.  There  were  10,108  firms 
remaining,  of which  about  6,000  were  banks;  these 
firms  extended  about  85  percent  of  all  covered 
credit.85 
All  non-exempt  lenders  based  on  their  covered 
credit  outstanding  on  March  14 had  to  file monthly 
reports  with  the  Federal  Reserve  (the  Federal  Home 
Loan  Bank  Board  for  thrifts  and  the  Federal  Credit 
Union  Association  for  credit  unions).  The  reports 
determined  the  lenders’  covered  credit  outstanding 
during  the previous  month  based  on the  daily average 
amount  outstanding  or  the  amount  outstanding 
on  a  date  approved  by  the  Board.86  For  multi- 
’ The  base  was  later  changed;  see  Section  VI. 
m Credit  card  credit  includes  credit  arising  from  purchases  on 
retail credit  card  plans  and  from cash  advances  extended  through 
such  plans.  Revolving  credit  includes  special  installment  over- 
draft  credit  and  revolving  credit  arising  from  arrangements  with 
travel  and  entertainment  charge  cards  and  other  nonbank  credit 
plans. 
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report  that  combined  the  covered  credit  issued  by 
all its  subsidiaries.87 
The  SDR  was  designed  to raise  the  cost  of credit 
extensions  and thus  discourage  credit  growth.  At the 
end  of  1979,  $38.4  billion  in credit  was  available  to 
Mastercard  holders,  of  which  3 1.6  percent  was 
used,  and  credit  lines  totalling  $27  billion  were 
available  to  Visa  cardholders,  with  48  percent  out- 
standing.  Though  the growth  in consumer  installment 
credit  outstanding  slowed  considerably  during  the  last 
half  of  1979  and  the  first  two  months  of  1980,  the 
Board  was  concerned  that  the  record  inflation  rates 
being  experienced  might  induce  credit  card  holders 
to  make  greater  use  of  their  cards’  credit  lines. 
Limiting  credit  use  through  price  rationing  was  not 
possible  because  state  usury  ceilings  prevented  card 
issuers  from  raising  credit  card  interest  rates  in 
response  to  inflation.s8 
Although  the  SDR  was only one part  of the  Board’s 
program,  it probably  had the  broadest  reach,  touching 
almost  every  American  consumer.  Many  economists, 
however,  questioned  the  SDR’s  usefulness.  They 
viewed  it as a cosmetic  measure  because  it applied 
only to a small fraction  of total credit  in the economy. 
In  terms  of credit  use  at  the  end  of  1979,  covered 
credit  was  48  percent,  or  $184  billion,  of the  $38 1 
billion  of  total  consumer  credit  outstanding,n  and 
total  credit  was  measured  to  be  approximately  $4 
trillion.89 As a result,  the  SDR  was  not  expected  to 
have  any  effect  on  inflation.90  There  was  also  con- 
cern  that  consumers  would  be unduly  harmed  by the 
requirement  because  they  had  few alternative  fund- 
ing sources.  Volcker  shared  that  concern  but believed 
that  the  requirement  was  needed: 
[T]hey  do  bite  at  the  consumer,  at  certain  types  of  con- 
sumer  lending,  but  ultimately  at consumer  spending  because 
that  is considered  under  present  conditions  not  to be an area 
of  high  priority,  given  that  credit  has  to  be  restrained 
overall.  .  .  . 
.  .  .  .  [The  Board  is]  trying  to  get  at  uses  of credit  that 
are  less  immediately  relevant  to  the  problems  of the  econ- 
omy  today.9r 
nThe  $381  billion  of  total  consumer  credit  consisted  of  all 
covered  open-  and  closed-end  credit  plus  credit  for  home 
improvement  loans,  automobiles,  mobile  homes,  service  credit 
(unpaid  bills  to  providers  of  services),  and  purchases  secured 
by the  goods  purchased  with  the  loan  proceeds.  Mortgage  debt 
is  not  included.  See  Memo  from  Axilrod,  Kichline,  and 
Petersen  to the  Board of Governors,  “Proposed  Consumer  Credit 
Regulation.” 
Marginal  Reserve  Requirements  on 
Managed  Liabilities 
As  described  in  Section  IV,  on  October  6,  1979 
the  Board  imposed  a marginal  reserve  requirement 
(MRR)  on  managed  liabilities  in  addition  to  the 
reserve  requirements  already  in  place.  The  MRR 
was  levied  on  domestic  member  banks  and  U.S. 
branches  and  agencies  of foreign  banks  and  applied 
to any increases  in their  managed  liabilities  over  their 
bases.  The  base  was  the  larger  of $100  million  and 
the  average  amount  of managed  liabilities  held  as of 
the  two  statement  weeks  ending  September  26. 
Institutions  with  managed  liabilities  exceeding  48  100 
million  had  to report  their  bases  to the  Fed  and were 
subject  to  the  program. 
The  objective  of the  MRR  was to slow bank  credit 
growth  by  raising  the  cost  of funds  used  to  finance 
lending  activity.  Bank  credit  growth  had  slowed  con- 
siderably  during  the fourth  quarter  of 1979;  however, 
the  slowdown  was  attributed  primarily  to  the  drop 
in  credit  demand  that  accompanied  an  increase  in 
the  cost  of funds  and  growing  concern  over  reces- 
sion prospects.  As demand  fell, banks  subject  to the 
MRR  reduced  their  managed  liabilities.  When  their 
managed  liabilities fell below their bases,  they  became 
able to increase  their lending  without  holding  marginal 
reserves.  This  made  the  MRR  less  effective.  Loan 
demand  rose  in January  and  February  of  1980,  but 
marginal  reserves  responded  considerably  less 
because  many  banks  could  finance  their  credit  ex- 
tensions  without  going  over  their  bases. 
The  MRR  also  failed  to  restrain  credit  growth 
because  of several  loopholes.  One  loophole  allowed 
large  domestic  commercial  banks  and  U.S.  agencies 
and  branches  of  foreign  banks  to  circumvent  the 
MRR  because  it  applied  to  net Eurodollar  borrow- 
ings,  borrowings  net  of balances  due  to a bank’s  own 
non-U.S.  branches.  This  loophole  worked  as follows. 
Consider  a financial  institution  using  Eurodollar  bor- 
rowings  to directly  fund  a loan.  The  MRR  required 
reserves  be  held  against  such  borrowings.  To  avoid 
holding  reserves,  however,  a bank  would  switch  its 
loan  customers  to  a foreign  affiliate  and  provide  its 
affiliate  with  the  funds  to  make  the  loan.  This  type 
of indirect  funding  created  Eurodollar  loans  to  off- 
set  Eurodollar  borrowings,  reducing  net  borrowings 
and  required  reserves.92 
A  second  loophole  existed  because  the  MRR 
applied  to large  time  deposits  with  maturities  of less 
than  one  year;  thus,  banks  could  issue  deposits  with 
longer  maturities  without  increasing  their  marginal 
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small  member  banks  and  agencies  and  branches  of 
foreign  banks  that  were  belay  their  bases,  and  so 
not  subject  to  the  MRR,  were  exempt  from  the  re- 
quirement.93  Banks  apparently  recognized  these 
methods  for  evading  the  reserve  requirement;  as  a 
chief  financial  officer  of  a  major  New  York  bank 
explained,  “ ‘If someone  really  doesn’t  want  to carry 
the  extra  reserves,  he  doesn’t  have  to.’  “94 
As part  of its March  14 credit  restraint  efforts,  the 
Board  tightened  the  MRR  on  member  banks  and 
U.S.  agencies  and  branches  of  foreign  banks  and, 
under  the  CCA,  extended  its  coverage  to  include 
non-member  banks.  The  Board raised  the MRR  from 
8 percent  to 10 percent  and  reduced  the  base  by the 
greater  of either  7 percent  or the  decrease  in a bank’s 
domestic  office  loans  to  foreigners  plus  the  gross 
balances  due from foreign  offices of other  institutions 
that  occurred  between  the  original  base  period  and 
the  week  ending  March  12. A bank’s  base  would  be 
reduced  even  further  by  future  drops  in  foreign 
lending.95  The  Board  expected  holdings  of marginal 
reserves  to increase  by about  $1.3  billion  as a result 
of  these  changes.96 
For  non-member  banks,  the  base  was  the  greater 
of $100  million  or  marginal  liabilities  over  the  two- 
week  period  ending  March  12. As for member  banks, 
the  base  would  decrease  by  the  amount  of  future 
reductions  in foreign  loans.  The  reserve  requirement 
was  10 percent.97 
Restraint  on  Money  Market  Mutual  Funds 
As part  of its  credit  restraint  program,  the  Board 
required  money  market  mutual  funds  (MMMFs)  and 
other  similar  creditors  to  maintain  a  non-interest- 
bearing  deposit  with  the  Federal  Reserve.  The 
deposit  was  equal  to  15 percent  of a fund’s  increase 
in assets  over  its  March  14 base  level.  The  15 per- 
cent  requirement  was  expected  to reduce  the  return 
on  a  brand  new  fund  by  approximately  2 percent. 
All  managed  creditors  had  to  report  their  bases  to 
the  Board  and,  on a monthly  basis,  their  daily average 
asset  levels.98 
The  reserve  requirement  on  MMMFs  was  de- 
signed  to slow  the  outflow  of funds  from  thrift  insti- 
tutions  and  smaller  banks.  The  percentage  change 
in the  growth  of consumer  savings  from  January  to 
September,  1979 relative  to the  same  period  in  1978 
was  184.2  at MMMFs,  -  13.3  at commercial  banks, 
-  14.9  at  savings  and  loan  associations,  -49.0  at 
credit  unions.  By  slowing  the  flow  of  funds  into 
MMMFs  and  thus  the  national  money  market,  the 
Board  hoped  to reduce  the  supply  of credit  available 
for large borrowers  while  easing  credit  availability  for 
borrowers  with  few  alternative  funding  sources.99 
The  legality  of the  Board’s  regulation  of MMMFs 
was  questioned  from  the  moment  the  program  was 
announced.  House  Representative  Reuss  argued  that 
the  public’s  transfer  of funds  from  thrifts  to MMMFs 
did  not  contribute  to  an  “extension  of  credit  in 
excessive  volume”  as required  for use of the  CCA.100 
The  Investment  Company  Institute,  a trade  associ- 
ation  of  mutual  funds,  considered  filing  a  lawsuit 
against  the  Fed,  charging  that  the  CCA  did  not 
authorize  the  Board  to  hinder  individuals’  attempts 
to  manage  their  savings  wisely  and  that  the  deposit 
requirement,  which  was essentially  a tax on the return 
to  MMMF  deposits,  was  unconstitutional  because 
only  Congress  could  impose  taxes.  The  Institute 
ultimately  decided  against  filing the  lawsuit  because 
it did not  want  “ ‘to disrupt  the  government’s  overall 
economic  program  and  because  the  precise  effects 
of the  [Bloard’s  action’  ” were  unclear.  Instead,  the 
Institute  formally  petitioned 
deposit  requirement.iOi  The 
exempting  certain  MMMFs 
although  it  began  requiring 
monthly,  rep0rting.O 
Discount  Rate  Surcharge 
the  Board  to  lift  the 
Board  responded  by 
from  the  regulation, 
weekly,  rather  than 
Acting  on requests  from  the  directors  of the  twelve 
Federal  Reserve  Banks,  the  Board  added  a  3  per- 
cent  surcharge  to the  rate  of  13 percent  charged  on 
discount  window  borrowings.  The  surcharge  applied 
only to borrowing  by banks  with  at least  $500  million 
in deposits  when  the  borrowing  occurs  in at least  two 
consecutive  weeks  or  more  than  four  weeks  in  a 
quarter.  Of  the  5,459  Federal  Reserve  member 
banks,  270  had  deposits  of at least  $500  million.iOz 
The  surcharge  was imposed  to discourage  frequent 
discount  window  borrowing  by the  largest  and  most 
active  users  of the  discount  window.  According  to 
the  Board,  because  the  surcharge  applied  only  to  a 
segment  of banks,  it would  have  a smaller  effect  on 
short-term  interest  rates  than would  a general  increase 
in  the  basic  discount  rate.  It  was  not  meant  as  a 
device  for  guiding  market  interest  rates.io3 
o Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Press 
Release,  April  11,  1980.  Exempted  were  “bona  fide”  personal 
trusts,  pension,  retirement,  and  other  tax-exempt  accounts 
invested  in MMMFs;  tax-exempt  assets  of MMMFs  that  invested 
at  least  80  percent  of  their  assets  in  short-term  tax  exempt 
obligations;  and  funds  with  a base  of under  $100  million.  Unit 
investment  trusts  were  allowed  to  be  “rolled  over”  without 
satisfying  the  deposit  requirement. 
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THEECONOMICEFFECTS  OF  THE 
1980  CREDIT  RESTRAINT  PROGRAM 
The  Immediate  Market  Response 
The  Board’s  announcement  of  its  CRP  ,was fol- 
lowed  immediately  by  turmoil  in  the  financial 
markets.ro4  On  Friday,  March  14,  the  day  of  the 
announcement,  the  prime  rate  was  18%  percent.  It 
rose  to  19 percent  Monday,  March  17,  the  third  in- 
crease  in four  business  days.  The  rise was attributed 
to the  increased  cost  of funds  caused  by the  Board’s 
modification  of the  marginal  reserve  requirement  on 
managed  liabilities. 10s  The  same  day,  Henry  Kauf- 
man  predicted  that  “ ‘the peaks  of credit  stringency 
and  of  interest  rates  are  still  ahead  of  us.’ “lo6 A 
Fed  official was reported  as admitting  that  the  CRP 
would  affect the  allocation  of credit.  “He  added  that 
‘rationing by price in the marketplace  hasn’t been  well 
distributed,  and  demand  for  credit  has  been  a  lot 
stronger  than  we  [the  Fed]  thought  it would  be.’ “lo7 
Between  the  end  of  February  and  the  middle  of 
March,  the  rate  on  90-day  Treasury  Bills rose  150 
basis points.  Announcement  of the  CRP  and  heavy 
government  supply caused  it to rise another  120 basis 
points  before  the end  of .March. According  to Donald 
Maude,  a  senior  vice  president  at  Merrill  Lynch 
Government  Securities,  Inc.,  “ ‘[T]he  appetite  of 
investors  for anything  with a maturity  longer  than  two 
years  is negligible  at best. ’ “‘0s By April,  two weeks 
after  the  CRP  began,  the  prime  rate  reached  20 
percent,  up  350  basis points  in one  month,  and  the 
federal  funds  rate  exceeded  19 percent.  The  rise  in 
the  funds  rate  equalled  about  two-thirds  of the  dis- 
count  rate  surcharge  on large  banks  and was not  ex- 
pected  by  the  Board.P 
Complying  With  the 
Program’s  Requirements 
There  was  considerable  confusion  among  con- 
sumers  and  businesses  over  how  to  comply  with 
the  program.  Although  the  Board  tried  to  keep  the 
p Many  banks  offered  small  businesses  a below-prime  interest 
rate  to satisfy  the  Board’s request  for special  programsfor  these 
borrowers.  In  addition,  the  Board  announced  on  April  17,  a 
“temporary  seasonal  credit  program”  for  banks  with  less  than 
$100  million  in deposits.  Aggregate  credit  lines  of $113  million 
were  arranged  under  the  program  for  129 banks,  primarily  from 
the  Midwest.  A total  of $1.5  million  was  actually  borrowed  by 
five banks.  This  low  borrowing  level  is attributed  to  the  steep 
decline  in  the  federal  funds  rate  after  April  17.  See  Board  of 
Governors,  “Federal  Reserve  Credit  Restraint  Program,”  p.  17; 
Letter  from  Volcker  to Chairman  Nowak,  August  20,  1980,  in 
U.S.  House,  Hearings on Federrol  Monetary Pohy  And Its Effect On 
Small  Basimxs (Part 3-Credit  Conttvk  and Avaiiabihy  of Credit), 
p.  329: 
control  program  simple  by  letting  lenders  indepen- 
dently  develop  policies  to  allocate  credit  in  ways 
consistent  with  the  regulations,  creditors  required 
much  more  detailed  instructions  regarding  reporting 
requirements,  maintenance  of special  deposits,  and 
monitoring  of compliance  with  supposedly  “volun- 
tary”  restrictions.  As  a  result,  the  Board  issued  9 
press  releases  over  8  weeks,  providing  answers  to 
commonly  asked  questions  about  all factors  of the 
program.  Daily  conference  calls  were  made  by 
the  Board  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  providing 
the  latest  interpretation  of  the  regulations  so  that 
the  regional  Reserve  Banks  could  handle  the 
thousands  of phone  calls they  received  for additional 
information.  lo9 
On  March  17,  Chairman  Volcker  was  in  Wash- 
ington,  D.C.  briefing  65  of the  leading  bankers  on 
the  CRP.  According  to  Th  Nm  York Times, he  told 
them  that  the  Board  expected  their  cooperation  with 
the  program,  and  he  drove  home  his point  by  sug- 
gesting  that  other  government  agencies  “would  be 
involved  in assuring  compliance  with  the  program.” 
After  the  meeting,  the  bankers  expressed  concern 
over  having  responsibility  under  the  program  for 
allocating  credit  among  their  customers.*10 
By mid-March,  when  the  voluntary  credit  restraint 
program  was  imposed,  loan  growth  at  many .banks 
was already  close  to,  if not exceeding,  the maximum 
9  percent  annual  rate.  Banks  were  especially  con- 
cerned  about  their  ability  to comply  with  the  volun- 
tary  credit  restraint  program  because  of  their  loan 
commitments.  Unused  commitments  at large  banks 
rose  from  $235.6  billion  at  the  end  of  December 
1979  to $248.4  billion at the  end  of February  1980, 
and  rose  even  further  before  March  14.  As of mid- 
March,  business  loans  outstanding  totalled  $157.3 
billion.111 If businesses  made  full. use  of  the  com- 
mitted  funds,  bank  lending  would  increase  much 
more  than  9 percent,  the  maximum  under  the  CRP. 
When  banks  expressed  concern  over  this  possi- 
bility,  the  Board  suggested  that  the  banks  decide 
which  prospective.  borrowers  had  legally  binding 
commitments  and  encourage  them  to  postpone 
takedowns  or  find  alternative  financing.“* 
Bankers,  especially  those  from banks  with a strong 
consumer  -orikntatidn,  were  upset  that  the  Board 
imposed  the  surcharge  instead  of raising  the  basic 
discount  rate.113  At  the  time,  federally  chartered 
banks  were  permitted  to charge  one  percentage  point 
more  than  the prevailing.discount  rate on loans made. 
Thus,  an  increase  in the  basic  discount.rate  would 
have provided  banks  some relief from usury  laws that 
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funds  rate  of  over  16  percent  on  March  14. 114 
The  immediate  effect  of  the  tightening  of  the 
marginal  reserve  requirement  on managed  liabilities 
was an increase  in the  number  of member  banks  with 
covered  managed  liabilities  in  excess  of their  base 
levels  from  115  to  199  between  February  27  and 
March  26.  The  number  of U.S.  branches  and  agen- 
cies  of foreign  banks  having  to  hold  such  reserves 
rose  from  19 to  44  over  the  same  period;  43  non- 
member  banks  were  also affected  by the  program  as 
of March  26.  Overall,  covered  managed  liabilities  in 
excess  of affected  institutions’  base  levels  rose  from 
$4.0  billion  to  $21.2  billion  between  February  27 
and  March  26.q 
As stated  in Section  V, the  Investment  Company 
Institute  decided  against  filing  a  lawsuit  over  the 
15  percent  special  deposit  requirement  levied  on 
MMMFs.  One  factor  behind  this  decision  was  the 
realization  that  the  regulation,  along  with  the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission’s  correspond- 
ing  requirement  that  MMMFs  disclose  the  effects 
of the  CRP  on their  funds,  would  not  be  as onerous 
as  first  thought.“5  James  Benham,  chairman  of 
Capital  Preservation  Fund,  was  quoted  as  saying 
“ ‘At first,  this  [the  CRP]  looked  very  messy  for  all 
of us,  but  now  I think  the  fund  business  is going  to 
continue  booming.’  “116 Many  MMMFs  initially 
responded  to  the  program  by  stopping  their  adver- 
tising  so  as  not  to  attract  new  investors.  Many 
stopped  accepting  new  accounts  altogether  but  con- 
tinued  accepting  deposits  from existing  shareholders. 
Existing  funds  expected  that  staying  below  their  base 
level,  and  thus  avoiding  the  15  percent  special 
deposit,  would  be  easier  than  originally  thought 
because  the  CRP  coincided  with  income  tax  season, 
which  could  increase  redemptions.117  Managers  of 
existing  funds  accepted  that  they  would  have  to keep 
at  least  small  amounts  on  deposit  because  of  the 
normal  errors  in  predicting  weekly  asset  levels. 
During  the  first  four  weeks  following  the  CRPs 
announcement,  MMMF  assets  declined  over  $1 
billion.lis  The  Board’s  March  28 exemption  of cer- 
tain  funds  from  the  special  deposit  requirement 
contributed  to  a resurgence  of asset  growth  in  the 
second  half of April,  as did the  creation  of new  funds, 
called “clones.”  Clone  funds  were  developed  to allow 
MMMFs  to  accept  new  deposits  without  lowering 
q Board  of  Governors,  “Federal  Reserve  Credit  Restraint 
Program,”  pp.  40,  42.  A  few  other  non-member  banks  later 
became  subject  to  the  program. 
the  return  to  incumbent  shareholders,  and  possibly 
exposing  the mutual  funds  to legal challenges  by these 
shareholders.  The  clones  held  portfolios  resembling 
those  of the  first  generation  funds  from  which  they 
derived.  By  late  April,  approximately  96  money- 
market  funds were  operating,  of which  1.5  were  clones 
with  assets  of about  $329  million.119 Of the  70 older 
funds  sold  to  individual  investors,  32  were  still 
accepting  additional  investments.  During  their  first 
few  weeks  of  operation,  the  clones  offered  higher 
yields  than  the  older  funds.  For  example,  as  of 
April  16,  clone  funds  offered  a  30-day  average 
yield  of  17  percent  while  older  funds  offered  only 
15.3  percent.120  This  differential  arose,  despite  the 
special deposit  requirement,  because  clones  that were 
set  up  quickly  were  invested  heavily  at  the  higher, 
post-controls  interest  rates.  By the  end  of May,  the 
older  funds  had  a  slight  yield  advantage.  Special 
deposits  by MMMFs  with  the  Board  peaked  at $8 17 
million  and  were  $573  million,  or  0.72  percent  of 
assets,  when  the  controls  were  lifted.‘*’ 
Besides  MMMF  assets,  increases  in  consumer 
credit  were  also  subject  to  a  15  percent  special 
deposit.  Announcement  of the  deposit  requirement 
on lenders  of certain  types  of consumer  credit  brought 
complaints  that  the  regulation  was unfair and difficult 
to comply  with  because  of existing  state  and  federal 
laws.  Specifically,  creditors  argued  that  the  choice 
of March  14 as  the  base  ignored  the  seasonality  in 
their  sales,  and  thus  credit  extensions.122  Also,  the 
Truth  in  Lending  Act  required  that  customers  be 
notified  of any  changes  in  the  terms  of  credit  card 
agreements.  Each  state  had  its own  notification  laws, 
requiring  between  15 and  10.5 days’ notice.  123  Credit 
card  issuers  complained  that  these  laws made  chang- 
ing card  terms  difficult.  Moreover,  changes  that  were 
made  could  not  be  applied  only  to  new  extensions 
of  credit  without  great  expense  and  delay;  conse- 
quently,  outstanding  balances  would  be  affected 
also.124 
In response  to  these  complaints,  the  Board  made 
several  technical  changes  in  its  consumer  credit 
restraint  regulations  on  April  2.  First,  the  Board 
established  a  uniform  national  requirement  that 
written  notice  of  changes  in  charge  account  terms 
be  given  to  account  holders  at  least  30  days  in 
advance.  Second,  account  holders  had  to  be  given 
the  option  of paying  their  outstanding  balances  under 
the  original  account  terms.  Although  the  Board 
superseded  state  notification  requirements,  it chose 
not  to  waive  state  interest  rate  ceilings.  Later  on 
April  14,  the  B.oard  did  waive  conflicting  federal 
regulations  on finance  charges  for oil company  credit 
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sales,  creditors  were’given  an BIternative  method  of 
calculating  their  bases.  They  could  use  either 
March  14  or  the  amount  of .outstanding  covered 
credit  for  March  1979,  scaled  up  by ‘a factor  based 
on the  increase  in.the  firm’s covered  credit  between 
March  1979  and  March  1980.  The  scaling  factor 
would  be, reduced  .by  one;twelfth  each  month  to 
make  the  SDR  applicable  by March  198 1 to any year- 
over-year  increase  in  covered  credit  over  the  base 
level.  Finally,  responding  to  a petition  by  the  Con- 
sumer  Federation  of America,  the  Board  said  that 
it would  try,  but  could  not promise,  to give the public 
an  opportunity  to  comment  on  rule  changes  before 
making  a final  decision.126 
Lenders  had  reduced  their  issuing  of credit  cards 
for  several  months  before  the  CRP  because  high 
market  interest  rates were  bumping  against usury  ceil- 
ings.127 Once  the  uniform  30-day  notification  require- 
ment  was  imposed,  they  began  modifying  their 
charge  account  terms.  A congressional  subcommit- 
tee  survey  of 59 creditors  offering  96  distinct  charge 
cards  found  that  the  most  frequent  change  in terms 
made  in response  to the  CRP  was  the  imposition  of 
an annual  fee.  This  change  was  made  on 49 percent 
of the  cards  surveyed.  Creditors  stopped  accepting 
credit  card  applications  for 42  percent  of the  cards. 
Forty-one  percent  raised  the  standards  for  qualify- 
ing for credit;  4 1 percent  changed  the  finance  charge 
calculation  method;  3.5 percent  increased  the  annual 
percentage  rate;  and  23  percent  increased  the 
minimum  monthly  payment.  Eighty-six  percent  of 
the  cards  had  their  changes  applied  retroactively  to 
the  account  holder’s  outstanding  balance.  Among  the 
most  stringent  actions  were  Exxon’s  announcement 
of  a  50  percent  increase  in  its  minimum  monthly 
charge  and that,  effective  August  1, single  purchases 
under  $40  would  be  included  in  the  minimum 
monthly  payment.  Even  in  1980,  a tank  of gas  cost 
less than  $40.128 To  discourage  credit  card  use more 
generally,  a  television  advertisement  ran  in  which 
Russell  Hogg,  president  of  the  Interbank  Card 
Association,  which  franchises  MasterCards, 
discouraged  use  of MasterCards  for  anything  other 
than  “ ‘necessities  and  emergencies.’  ‘Qua 
The  Big  Surprise 
On  March  24, just  ten  days  after  the  CRP  began, 
the  Administration  saw the  first sign of recession:  an 
increase  in  unemployment  benefit  applications.  130 
As  the  Administration  later  explained, 
Early in  1980 there  were  few signs  of recession.  If anything, 
activity  seemed  to  be  picking  up.  The  evidence  available 
at  the  time  hinted  that  households  .  .  . were  on  a buy-in- 
advance  spending  spree.  ;  .  . 
By early  March  there  was  fear  that  inflationary  pressures 
. . . were  mounting  . . .,  and  that  without  some  additional 
action  these  would  . .  . . lead  to  an explosion  of prices.  . . . 
It was  in  this  environment  that  .  . . . the  President  autho- 
rized  .  .  .  selective  controls  on  credit.131 
In retrospect,  it appears  that  . . . interest  rates  finally had 
reached  levels  in late  February  and  early March  which  were 
sufficient  to discourage  borrowing.  However,  data  [available 
when  the  credit  controls  were  planned]  .  .  . did  not  show 
‘this  development.  .  .  .’ [N]ew  home  sales  fell  slightly  in 
February  and  plunged  in  March,  although  the  only  infor- 
mation  available  in  early  March  had  shown  that  sales 
advanced  in  January.r3* 
Additional  evidence  of recession  soon  followed  the 
unemployment  data.  Statistics  for  March  indicated 
that  the  narrow  money  aggregates  fell sharply  in late 
March;  the  Board  attributed  this  to  the  increased 
opportunity  cost  of  holding  money  caused  by  the 
reserve  requirements  on managed  liabilities  and.the 
start  of a recession.133  Weekly  data  for  large  banks 
showed  loan  growth  remaining  strong  through  early 
March,  but  slowing  considerably  over  the  rest  of the 
month.  As a result,  total  bank  loan growth  for March 
fell  to  an  adjusted  annual  rate  of  2%  percent  from 
rates  of  15 percent  to  20 percent  earlier  in the  year. 
Consumer  installment  credit  rose  only  5 percent  in 
March  and  7 percent  for  the  first  quarter.134  Hous- 
ing starts  suffered  their  largest  fall in twenty  years. 135 
By April  11,  market  analysts  were  speculating  that 
the  Board would  ease its credit  controls  soon  because 
of the  accumulating  evidence  suggesting  that  a severe 
recession  was  underway.136 
One  month  after  credit  controls  were  imposed 
interest  rates  began  a sharp  decline.  The  prime  rate 
was  19.5 percent  on April  18, while the  federal  funds 
rate  was  18.3  percent  and  the  3-month  commercial 
paper  rate  was  16.2 percent.  The  3-month  Treasury 
bill  rate,  which  had  peaked  at  16.5  percent  at  the 
end  of March,  was  down  to  13.8  percent,  its lowest 
level  since  the  beginning  of  March.lJ7  Traders  re- 
joiced  that  the  corporate  bond  market  was  reborn 
because  companies  once  again  began  seeking  long- 
term  financing.  Market  analysts  attributed  the  bond 
market’s  revival  to anticipations  that  inflation  would 
not  be  allowed  to  get  out  of  control  and  to  firms’ 
attempts  to replace  bankloans  with fured-cost  market 
financing.138 
The  consumer  credit  controls  were  largely  sym- 
bolic  and without  teeth;  however,  they  induced  con- 
sumers  to  alter  their  buying  behavior.  Consumer 
spending,  especially  credit-financed  expenditures, 
fell  off  dramatically.  The  country’s  major  retailers 
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enced  declines  of about  20 percent  in charge  account 
applications  and  10  percent  in  credit  sales  during 
March  and April. I39  Retail  sales fell at the  fastest  rate 
in  twenty-nine  years.  140 According  to  economist 
S.  Lees  Booth,  the  program  “ ‘may have  been  sym- 
bolic,  but  it was  shocking.’  ” A Nm  Yo& Times/CBS 
News  poll  taken  in  April  showed  “58  percent  of 
Americans  . . . using  credit  cards  less  than  they  did 
. . . in [ 19791, while  only  5 percent  were  using  them 
more.“141  As  President  Carter  described  the  situ- 
ation,  “(Mlany  [credit]  card  holders  began  to believe 
that  it  was  almost  unpatriotic  to  buy  items  on 
credit.“14* Typical  of the  letters  Carter  received  from 
the  public  regarding  the  controls  was  one  from 
Dennis  Gordon  of San Francisco,  California.  It read, 
We  are  supporting  you  sir,  one-hundred  percent.  Your 
inflation  fighting  program  has  forced  us  into  alternatives 
that  we  are  not  finding  hard  to  live with.  We  are  spending 
with  more  wisdom  and  not  as  frequently.  We  are  drawing 
closer  to  each  other  during  this  fight  against  inflation. 
An  evening  once  ‘[spent]  going  “out  on  the  town”  is 
now  enjoyed  gathering  in  our  home  or  the  homes  of 
friends.  We  have  once  again  discovered  parlour  games, 
sing  songs,  lengthy  walks  and  other  means  of  “old 
fashioned”  entertainment. 
I believe  myself  and  my group  of friends  are  not  unique. 
I  believe  all  across  America  we  are  pulling  together  to 
survive,  and  will  do  so  quite  nicely  and  to  our  surprise, 
comfortably.i43 
An  informal  New York Times  survey  of consumers  in 
Ridgewood,  New  Jersey  revealed  similar  attitudes.  144 
The  decline  in consumer  spending,  however,  con- 
cerned  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  at its 
April  22 meeting.  According  to the  Board’s  descrip- 
tion  of  the  meeting, 
The  contraction  in  activity  was  projected  to  be  somewhat 
larger  than  had  been  anticipated  a month  earlier  and  to  be 
accompanied  by a substantial  increase  in unemployment.  . . . 
The  degree  of prospective  weakness  in consumer  spend- 
ing was  viewed  as a major  source  of uncertainty.  The  anti- 
inflationary  measures  announced  on March  14 appeared  to 
have  curbed  considerably  spending  in anticipation  of price 
increases.  It was  noted  in this  connection  that  a rise  in the 
saving  rate  from  the  abnormally  low  levels  of  the  most 
recent  two  quarters  to  a more  normal  rate  would  imply  a 
marked  cutback  in  consumer  spending.  .  .  .  However,  it 
would  be  premature  to  conclude  that  inflationary  attitudes 
and  behavior  had  been  fundamentally  altered,  especially 
in view  of the  prospect  that  the  rapid  rise  in the  consumer 
price  index  would  persist  for  a number  of  months.  .  .  . 
Several  members  noted  their  concern  that  if a large decline 
in interest  rates  were  to  occur  over  the  next  few  weeks,  it 
was  likely to be perceived  by some  market  participants  . . . 
as  an  easing  of  monetary  policy  and  could  have  very  un- 
desirable  repercussions  on  inflationary  psychology  . . . .145 
For  the  month  of April,  the  narrow  money  aggre- 
gates  again  fell sharply,  hitting  below  the  lower  end 
of the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee’s  long-run 
target  range.  Only  three  banks  still had  annual  loan 
growth  rates  exceeding  9 percent.  Total  bank  loans 
outstanding  fell  5  percent  (annualized).  146 
In May,  interest  rates  plummeted,  falling about  one 
percentage  point  each  week.147  Bank  loan  growth 
declined  further.  The  slowdown  in bank  loan growth 
in April  and  May  reduced  by  over  100  the  number 
of financial institutions  having  to hold reserves  against 
managed  liabilities.’  By  May  5,  market  analysts 
speculated  that  the  end  of the  CRP  was near  because 
“the  measures  weren’t  needed  in the  first place,”  and 
the  program  was  “ ‘scaring  people  away  from  the 
stores.’  ” The  consumer  controls  were  expected  to 
be  lifted  within  six  weeks.14a 
The  Board’s  first  step  toward  easing  the  controls 
was  elimination  on May  7 of the  3 percent  discount 
rate  surcharge.  While  the  surcharge  was in place,  few 
banks  had to pay  it because  it had been  imposed  only 
two  weeks  before  the  first  quarter  ended.  Conse- 
quently,  at most  seven  banks  paid  the  surcharge  in 
any  statement  week,  and  almost  all  that  did  bor- 
rowed  in two  consecutive  weeks.  The  surcharge  was 
lifted just  days  before  any  banks  could  be  subject  to 
the  surcharge  for  borrowing  four  weeks  in  any 
quarter.S 
On  May  14,  Volcker  announced  that  the  Board 
could  “ ‘legitimately  look  forward  to  dismantling’ 
[the  CRP].  .  .  .  ‘We  have  not  wanted  to  move 
prematurely,  we  will  not.  .  .  . But  equally,  we  are 
not  interested  in fostering  any impression  that  credit 
allocation,  formal  or informal,  can  be  any part  of the 
basic,  continuing  armory  of  monetary  policy.’  “149 
The  Board  eased  the  credit  restraint  measures  con- 
siderably  on  May  22,  the  day  lenders  of consumer 
credit  were  to make  their  first  special  deposit.  It cut 
the  deposit  requirement  on  consumer  credit  and 
MMMFs  from  15  percent  to  7.5  percent,  cut  the 
reserve  requirement  on  managed  liabilities  from  10 
percent  to  5  percent,  and  revised  its  lending 
guidelines  to  make  credit  more  available  for certain 
I Board  of  Governors,  “Federal  Reserve  Credit  Restraint 
Program,”  pp.  40,42.  The  excess  of covered  managed  liabilities 
over  base  levels  dropped  by  $11.1  billion  over  this  period. 
’ Peter  Keir,  “Impact  of  Discount  Policy  Procedures  on  the 
Effectiveness  of Reserve  Targeting,”  in Neee,  Monetary Cm&  Pro- 
c&m,  pp.  158-159  and  Table  2. Those  paying  the  surcharge 
borrowed  an  average  of  $80  million. 
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while,  encouraged  consumers  to  return  to  the 
stores.isl 
The  May  easing  of the  CRP  did not  slow the  flow 
of bad  economic  news  in June.  Early  in the  month, 
data  was  released  showing  that  unemployment  rose 
1.6 percentage  points  to  7.8  percent  over  April  and 
May;  it was  the  largest  two-month  increase  ever.15* 
In addition,  consumer  installment  debt  fell 8 percent 
in April,  with  the  decline  greatest  for personal  loans. 
This  was  the  first  decrease  in consumer  debt  since 
May  1975.1s3 On  the bright  side, producer  prices  rose 
only  0.3  percent  in  May.  Economist  Lawrence 
Chimerine,  chairman  of  Chase  Econometrics, 
called  the  credit  controls  “ ‘overkill,’  ” and  saw  the 
recession  as being  “very  severe,”  with  little  chance 
of a quick  recovery.  ls4 By the  end  of June,  the  Na- 
tional  Bureau  of Economic  Research  declared  that 
the  economy  was  in  a recession  that  had  begun  in 
January.  I55 
The  economy  was  so weak  by  late  June  that  the 
controls  were  nonbinding.156  As  a result,  on July  3 
the  Board  announced  the  phase-out  of the  CRP,  and 
President  Carter  removed  the  Board’s authority  under 
the  CCA  except  as  needed  to  end  the  program. 
Carter  warned  that  he  retained  the  authority  to 
impose  controls  and  would  invoke  the  CCA  again 
if signs  of excessive  credit  use reappeared.’  Retailers 
were  concerned  that  the psychological  effect the  con- 
trols  had  on  consumers  might  not  be  reversed  by 
simply  lifting  the  controls.157  They  immediately 
began  planning  credit  promotions  in  hopes  of 
revitalizing  charge  sales,  although  they  retained  many 
of the  more  stringent  credit  policies  they  had adopted 
while the  controls  were  in place  (e.g.  annual  fees  and 
higher  minimum  monthly  payments)  because  they 
were  “good  business  practices.“158 
Data  released  July 9 showed  that  consumer  install- 
ment  credit  fell  a record  13 percent  in  May.  New 
consumer  credit  extensions  were  25  percent  lower 
than  the  September  1979 peak.  These  declines  were 
attributed  to the  effect  the  CRP  had  on consumers. 
Between  January  and May,  output  of consumer  goods 
fell 3.7  percent,  while  retail  sales  fell  10.3  percent. 
From  April  through  June,  preliminary  data  showed 
an  8.5  percent  (annualized)  decline  in  GNP.  Infla- 
tion,  however,  was  down  to  11 percent  by July,  as 
was  the  prime  rate.ls9 
t Board  of Governors,  Press  Release,  July 3,  1980.  Also  “White 
House  Credit  Text,”  Th  Nz-w  Yod  Zhes,  July  4,  1980.  The 
reserve  requirement  on  managed  liabilities  would  be  lifted 
July  10;  the  special  deposit  on  consumer  credit,  July  23;  and 
the  deposits  by  MMMFs,  July  ‘28. 
The  Aftermath  of  the  Controls  Program: 
Another  Surprise 
After  the  precipitous  drop  in  economic  activity 
during  the  second  quarter,  economists  generally 
expected  the  recession  to  last  through  the  end  of 
1980  and  be  almost  as severe  as the  1974-75  reces- 
sion.  In  reality,  however,  private  sector  demand 
“rebounded  with  surprising  alacrity.”  The  sharp  drop 
in interest  rates  was  a driving  force  in the  recovery, 
stimulating  housing  and consumption.  Housing  starts 
rose  70 percent  between  May,  their  low point,  and 
September;  car  sales  also  rebounded  dramatically, 
increasing  28  percent  between  May  and  October. 
Although  outstanding  consumer  installment  credit 
experienced  its largest  decline  in the  postwar  period 
during  the  second  quarter,  it began  rising  as soon  as 
the  controls  were  lifted,  albeit  at a slower  pace  than 
early  in the  year.  The  rise  in credit  use  was  accom- 
panied  by  an  increase  in  consumer  spending.  Real 
retail  sales  rose  17.8  percent  in  June  and  27.3 
percent  in July.  In  the  third  quarter,  real  personal 
consumption  expenditures  rose  5.1  percent,  com- 
pared  with  a  record  9.8  percent  second  quarter 
decline. 
The  drop  in interest  rates  in the  spring  was  short- 
lived.  As the  economy  strengthened  and inflationary 
pressures  intensified,  the  demands  for  money  and 
credit  increased  and  interest  rates  rose.  The  prime 
rate  climbed  from  11 percent  in July to 2 1.5 percent 
in December.  The  federal  funds  rate  hit  19.8  per- 
cent  as  the  three-month  commercial  paper  rate 
reached  19.5  percent. 
Looking  at  1980  in  its  entirety,  the  economy 
experienced  a short  but  severe  recession  during  the 
first  half  of  the  year  and  quickly  recovered  during 
the  second  half.  Real  GNP  remained  essentially  un- 
changed,  while  the  money  aggregates  were  close  to 
the  upper  end  of  the  Federal  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee’s  fourth  quarter-to-fourth  quarter  target  ranges. 
Disposable  income  rose  only  0.5  percent,  but  per- 
sonal  consumption  fell 0.3  percent.  Consequently, 
saving  rose  one  percentage  point  over  the  previous 
year,  fourth  quarter  to fourth  quarter,  to 5.7  percent. 
The  CPI,  excluding  food,  energy,  and home  purchase 
and  finance,  rose  9.0  percent  between  April  and 
November,  slower  than  the  12 percent  rate  during 
the  first quarter,  but  higher  than  the  7.2 percent  rate 
for the year  ending  November  1979.i60 In retrospect, 
the  credit  control  program  appears  to  have  lowered 
interest  rates  and  inflation  only  while  it  was  in 
effect,  and  did  so by worsening  a recession  that  was 
already  underway. 
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preliminary  study  in  1980  of  the  CRP’s  overall 
economic  impact.161  DRI  found  that 
“the  March  14 Credit  Controls  had  some  negative  impact 
on  the  economy  in  the  second  quarter.  .  .  .  The  credit 
controls  did  make  the  fall  off  in  economic  growth  more 
severe.” 
In  addition,  DRI  concluded  that  the  CRP  reduced 
real output,  but  not  inflation;  other  factors  accounted 
for the lower inflation rate during  the  second  and third 
quarters.U  DRI’s  simulations  indicated  that  the 
CRPs  total,  long-run  cost  to society  would  be losses 
of $23  billion  of GNP,  $19  billion  of total  consump- 
tion,  300,000  man-years,  50,000  housing  starts,  and 
500,000  new  domestic  car  sales. 
VII. 
WHATWENTWRONG? 
Although  the  1980  recession  was underway  before 
the  CRP  was  imposed,  the  Board,  the  Administra- 
tion,  and  the  financial  markets  believed  that  the 
program  contributed  to the  steep  fall-off in economic 
activity  beginning  in  March.  This  slowdown  is 
apparent  in the  time  series  of the  key macroeconomic 
variables,  as  Figures  l-10  show.  This  section  ad- 
dresses  two  questions:  To  what  extent  did  the  con- 
trols  accomplish  the  Boards  objectives?  To  what 
extent  did  they  contribute  to  the  recession? 
Each  component  of  the  CRP  had  a  different 
effect  on  the  economy.  Some  accomplished  what 
they  were  designed  to do; others  did not.  Some  were 
too  effective  at  reducing  credit  use. 
The  reserve  requirements  on  managed  liabilities 
and  the  discount  rate  surcharge  were  not  expected 
to  affect  market  interest  rates,  but  they  did.  The 
imposition  of these  measures  immediately  raised  the 
cost  of  funds  to  large  banks.  This  increased  cost 
quickly  led to increases  in the prime  and federal funds 
rates.  Loan  growth  slowed  as the  rising  interest  rates 
priced  borrowers  out  of  the  credit  markets. 
Also  contributing  to  the  decline  in  bank  lending 
was  the  voluntary  credit  restraint  program.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  Board, 
It  is  difficult,  if not  impossible,  to  say  how  much  of  the 
weakness  in  bank  loans  [under  the  program  was]  .  .  . due 
to  the  recession,  how  much  to reaction  to fiscal  announce- 
ments  and  general  credit  conditions  (including  expectational 
effects),  how  much  to  the  cumulative  effects  of  earlier 
” The  Chamber  of Commerce’s  summary  of DRI’s  results  does 
not  specify  what  these  other  factors  might  be. 
overall  restraints,  and  how  much  to  the  credit  restraint 
programs.  But  the  timing  and  abruptness  of the  change  in 
loan  growth  trends  suggest  that  announcement  of the  pro- 
grams  played  a significant  role.  Indeed  the  immediate  effect 
of the  programs  on bank  lending  may have been  exaggerated 
by  the  initial  reactions  of  lenders  to  these  restraints,  as 
they  sought  to evaluate  what  the  Federal  Reserve  actions- 
especially  the  6  to  9  percent  limitation-would  mean  in 
their  particular  case  .  .  .  .162 
In  contrast,  the  special  deposit  requirement  on 
MMMFs  was  designed  not  to  reduce  credit  use  but 
rather  to  alter  the  disintermediation  from  financial 
institutions.  It  did  not  accomplish  its  objective 
because,  as explained  in Section  VI,  it had  a negli- 
gible  effect  on  fund  yields.  Although  assets  at 
MMMFs  fell during  the  first four weeks  of the  CRP, 
they  quickly  recovered,  growing  over  30  percent 
between  mid-March  and  late  J~1y.l~~ 
Similarly,  the  consumer  credit  restraint  program 
was  not  expected  to  have  a major  impact  on  credit 
use or consumer  behavior  because  it focused  primarily 
on charge  card  credit  and personal  loans  and was  im- 
posed  on lenders,  rather  than  directly  on consumers. 
Consequently,  the  declines  in consumer  installment 
credit,  personal  consumption  expenditures,  and retail 
sales were  a big surprise.  This  surprise  may have been 
caused  in part  by the  response  of charge  card  issuers 
to  the  restraint  program.  Despite  the  Boards  an- 
nouncements  that  the  CRP  would  be  in place  only 
temporarily,164  many  of the  changes  in charge  card 
terms  made  under  the  program  were  not  designed 
for temporary  use.  The  most  effective,  least  costly, 
and  easiest  ways  for creditors  to temporarily  reduce 
the  growth  of charge  card  use  were  to  stop  accept- 
ing  card  applications  and  reduce  credit  lines  while 
the  program  was  in place.  These  were  not  the  steps 
most  commonly  taken  in response  to  the  controls. 
Rather,  creditors  more  often  introduced  annual  fees 
and changed  the  methods  of calculating  the  minimum 
balance  and  finance  charge,  changes  that  were  more 
costly  to  implement  and  inconsistent  with  the  pro- 
gram’s temporary  nature.  These  changes  also applied 
retroactively,  thereby  penalizing  charge  account 
holders  generally  rather  than  only  those  who  used 
their  cards  while  the  controls  were  in force.”  Because 
creditors  decided  individually  how  to respond  to the 
CRP,  the  changes  made  in credit  terms  varied  greatly 
across  charge  cards.  The  diversity  in  charge  term 
changes,  together  with the failure of creditors  to com- 
municate  these  changes  clearly,  contributed  to con- 
sumers’  confusion  over  the  impact  of the  program 
on  their  finances.165 
” Many  of these  changes  are  still  in  place  today. 
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Figures  1, 2,  and  3 use  quarterly  data,  all others 
use  monthly  data.  Data  points  are  centered  over 
their  respective  time  periods,  those  periods 
represented  by  segments  between  tick  marks. 
Data  for  Figures  1-5,  8,  and  9  are  seasonally 
adjusted. 
Gray  shading  indicates  period  of Credit  Controls: 
March  14,198O  . July  3,  1980. 
45 As the preceding  discussion  indicates,  the  CRP  led 
to an immediate  rise  in short-term  interest  rates  and 
affected  consumers’  buying  psychology.  The  rise  in 
interest  rates  was  only  temporary;  within  a  month 
after  the  CRP  began,  rates  started  falling.  This  sug- 
gests  that  the  CRP  resulted  in an immediate  decrease 
in the  supply  of credit,  followed  by a larger  decrease 
in the  demand  for  credit.  The  drop  in demand  was 
in addition  to the  decline  that  would  have  occurred 
even  in the  absence  of credit  controls  because  of the 
recession  that  was  already  underway. 
Looking  back  on the  CRP,  Board  Vice  Chairman 
Schultz  explained  why  it  did  not  work  as planned: 
We  [the  Board]  learned  in  1980  that  it is exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to assess  in advance  the  impact  of controls  on economic 
activity.  When  the  Board  enacted  its  program,  we  did  not 
anticipate,  and  we  had  no  reason  to  anticipate,  the  market 
impact  it  would  have.  G&n  t/re  limited  coverage of  the 
program,  it woaki  have  been eqected  to have  had a moderate 
effect  on  amgate  demand;  however,  we  did  not  reckon 
comxtLy  the  dimensions  of  the  pqhoLogka1  impact  of  the 
prvgrom  on  homers  and  lends.  To  be  sure,  some  of 
this  impact  owed  in part  to a misunderstanding,  especially  at 
the  beginning,  about  the  scope  and  intent  of the  program, 
but  beyond  this,  there  was  [a] remarkable  shift  in attitudes 
that  led  to  a sudden  contraction  of credit  flows.  This  con- 
traction  involved  even  those  sectors  that  were  explicitly 
exempted  from  the  controls,  and  . . . contributed to a sharp 
economic recetion.  Then,  when  we  removed  the  controls 
in the  early  summer,  we  were  surprised  once  again  by how 
quickly  the  economy  snapped  back.166 [emphasis  added] 
Two  events  increased  uncertainty  concerning  labor 
income  in the  first  half of  1980.  First,  rumors  began 
spreading  in  late  1979  that  a  recession  was  immi- 
nent,  but  its  length  and  severity  were  unknown. 
This  led  to  a  slowdown  in  consumer  credit  use  in 
late  1979  and. early  1980.  Second,  the  imposition 
of credit  controls  in mid-March  increased  consumers’ 
uncertainty  about  their  ability  to  use  their  charge 
cards  and  obtain  personal  loans.  For  consumers, 
charge  cards  and  personal  loans  are  a  source  of 
liquidity  ,and  a  means  to  smooth  their  consump- 
tion  expenditures  over  time  because  they  enable 
consumers  to  access  their  future  income.  Conse- 
quently,  the  controls  raised  consumers’  uncertainty 
about  the  amount  of income  accessible  in the  pres- 
ent,  causing  consumers  to reduce  current  consump- 
tion  even  more  sharply  than  they  had  before  the 
controls  became  effective.‘” 
w Why  would  consumers  alter  their  buying  behavior  as they  did 
in  response  to  restrictions  on  credit  card  use  and  extensions 
of personal  loans?  The  economics  literature  shows  that  when 
faced  with  greater  uncertainty  regarding  labor  income  increases 
(i.e.  increases  in the  variance  of expected  future  income),  a risk- 
averse  consumer  will  reduce  current  consumption  and  plan  to 
Table  I presents  evidence  supporting  the  claim that 
the  1980  recession  was “ ‘the worst  consumer  reces- 
sion  since  World  War  II.’ “167  The  table,  which  is 
patterned  after  one  by  Barro,r6*  shows  the  shortfall 
in real  GNP  for  each  recession  since  World  War  II 
and  the  percentage  of  the  shortfall  attributable  to 
personal  consumption  and  investment.  The  short- 
fall is  calculated  as  the  average  over  all quarters  in 
a recession  of the  deviation  of actual  GNP  from  its 
trend  level.  For  the  1980  recession,  personal  con- 
sumption  accounted  for  79.4  percent  of the  short- 
fall in real  GNP;  this  is more  than  twice  the  average 
34.8  percent  contribution  for all postwar  recessions 
and  is 36 percentage  points  greater  than  that  for the 
1973-1975  recession.  The  contribution  of expendi- 
tures  on durable  goods  alone  is 37 percent,  3.3  times 
the  average  of 11.2 percent.  In contrast,  investment, 
defined  as  gross  fixed  investment  plus  the  change 
in business  inventories,  contributed  64.9  percent  of 
the  shortfall  in real output,  compared  with  an average 
of 69.5  percent  for all recessions  considered.x  Thus, 
this  evidence  suggests  that  the  CRP  contributed  to 
the  1980  recession  by  inducing  a greater  reduction 
in consumption,  especially  consumption  of durable 
goods,  than  that  in  the  typical  postwar  recession.Y 
VIII. 
THEFATEOFTHECREDITCONTROLACT 
Senator  Helms’s  attempt  to  repeal  the  CCA  in 
1979  was  not  the  last  such  attempt.  In  fact,  while 
selective  credit  controls  were  in  place  in  1980, 
another  effort  was  made  at legislative  repeal.  In May 
1980,  Senator  William  Armstrong  proposed  an 
amendment,to  Senate  bill S.  2352,  which  would  ex- 
tend  authorization  for the  Council  on Wage  and Price 
Stability.  The  amendment  would  end  the  President’s 
authority  under  the  CCA  as  of July  1,  1981.  Ac- 
cording  to  the  amendment’s  supporters, 
increase  future  consumption.  That  is,  the  consumer  behaves 
more  prudently,  saving  more  in  the  current  period  as  a  pre- 
caution  against  possible  future  misfortune.  See  Olivier  jean 
Blanchard  and  Stanley  Fischer,  Lectrrfes on Macnzconomics  (The 
MIT  Press,  1989)  pp.  279291;  Stephen  P.  Zeldes,  “Optimal 
Consumption  with  Stochastic  Income:  Deviations  from Certainty 
Equivalence,”  Th  Qaartdy  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  104, 
no.  2  (May  1989)  pp.  275298. 
’ For  some  recessions,  the  percentage  contributions  of consump- 
tion  and  investment  to  the  GNP  shortfall  sum  to  over  100 
percent.  This  occurs  when  government  purchases  and  net 
exports  combined  had  a  stimulative  effect,  contributing  to  a 
reduction  (i.e.  a  negative  percentage  change)  in  the  GNP 
shortfall. 
y There  are  methods,  other  than  those  used  in  Table  I,  for 
calculating  the  shortfall  in real  GNP.  They  result  in consump- 
tion  making  an  even  greater  contribution  to  the  shortfall  than 
shown  here. 
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Breakdown  of  Shoiffall  in. Real  GNP  During  Postwar  Recessions 
Time  Period  of  Recession 
Quarterly* 
Monthly 
Average  Quarterly  Shortfall 
of  Real  GNP** 
Average  Quarterly  Real  GNP 
Average  Shortfall’as  a  %  of 
Average  Trend  Real  GNP 
48:  IV-’  53:ll-  57:lll-  6O:ll-.  7O:l-  73:IV-  ’  8O:l-  81:lll 
:  49:lll  .54:11  58:l  61:1  ,7O:IV  75:l  8O:ll  .’  82:~‘.  Mean  for 
48:11-  53:7-  57:8-  60:4-  69:12-  73:11-  80:1-  81:7-  Postwar 
49:lO  54:5  58:4  61:2  70:11-.  75:3  80~7  82:  11  Recessions 
9.56  17.66  28.03  13.61  22.08  38.17  ha.29  41.20  27.32 
1114.53  1429.13  1534.97  1665.15  2417.53  2720.47  3195.25  3191.28  2158.54 
;. 
0.86  ‘1.24  1.83  0.82  0.91  .1.40  1.51  1.29  1.23 
%  of  Real  GNP  Shortfall  accounted  for  by: 
Personal  Consumption  Expenditures.  26.15  20.66  26.24.  37.43  26.26  43.35  79.38  18.51  .34.75 
Durables  -14.45  ,4:70  10.15  16.33  19.57  16.02  ,  37.02  0.59  11.24 
Nondurables  ,,’  19.52  17.54  12.88  19.22  4.67  21.98  24.66  9.41  16.23 
Services  21.08  -  1.58  3.21  1.88  2.02  5.36  17.71  8.50  7.27 
Gross  Fixed  Investment  plus  Change  in 
Business  Inventories  129.41  27.86  48.03  107;99  38.36  72.02  64.94  67.50  69.51 
Other*  l l  -  55.56  51;48  25.73  -45.41  ”  35.39  -  15.38  -44.32  14.00  -4.26 
*  Barre  studies  the  period  1929-1982  and  uses  annual  data;  consequently,  he  combines  the  1980  and  1981-82  recessions.  Here,  .quarMy,  data  are 
used.  In  determining.the  first  and  last,quarter  in  a  recession,  we  include  quarters  with  at  least  two  months  of  recession. 
l *  The  shortfall,  measured  in  billions  of  1982  dollars,  is the’average  difference  between  trend  GNP  and  actual  GNP  for  each  quarter  in  the  recession,  Trend 
GNP  is  determined  ,by  multiplying  the  actual  GNP  for  the  previous  quarter  by  the  trend  quarterly  growth  rate  of  0.8%  +  for  the  period  studied,’ 
l l l  “Other”  consists  qf  government  purchases  and  net  exports. 
Having  suffered  the  inevitable  inequities,  costs  and  frus- 
trations  inherent  in . . . [selective  credit  controls],  a coalition 
of business  and  consumers  want  the  March  14th  program 
stopped  and  the  Act  repealed.  .  .  . 
On  paper,  the  credit  control  program  was  simple:  direct 
bankers  to  restrain  credit  lending,  allowing  each.  to  say 
how.  In  reality,  the  program  has  been.a  nightmare.169 
During  Senate  debate  of the. amendment,  Helms 
argued  that 
_‘.  . 
[b]y leaving  the  Credit  Control  Act on the  books,  we make 
it almost  mandatory  that  the  President  use  it when  he has a 
seemingly  good,  excuse  to  use  it:  In  other  words;  if  he 
neglected  to use  it,  some  m’ight say that  he was  not”doing 
all he  could”  to  fight  inflation:  By  leaving  such  an  act, on 
the books,  we make  the  President  more  subject  to pressures 
to  “do  something”  even  though  “doing  something”  using 
credit  controls  is  the  wrong  thing  to  do.*‘0 
The  House  considered  its  version  of  the  bill  in 
September.  This  bill did not  include  ,an amendment 
for  sunsetting  the  CCA.  In  debate  ‘of  the;  bill, 
Representative  Annunzio  suggested  that  the  Senate’s 
amendment  was  politically  motivated  to  detract 
attention  from  the  success  of President  Carter’santi- 
inflation program  and’hurt  his chances  &I  the  upcom- 
ing  election.r7r 
A  conference  committee  met  to. arrange  a  com- 
promise  between  the  House  and  Senate  versions. 
The  committee  amended  the  Senate  bill to  sunset 
the  CCA  on June  30,  1982,  a year  later  than  origi- 
nally proposed.  The  Senate  approved  the Armstrong 
amendment  and  S.  2352  by  votes  of  43-40  and 
72-11,  respectively,  and  the  House  gave  its 
unanimous  consent  to S. 2352  as amended.172 Carter 
signed  the,  bill  into  law  on  December  9,  1980,’ 
stating, 
I  believe  that  abolishing  the  authorization  granted  to  the 
President,under  the  [C,CA] .  .  . is highly  unwise,  because 
many  of  the  act’s  provisions  can  be  extremely  helpfuI,at 
critical  periods  in the  fight against  inflation.  This  is no time 
to strip  a President  of inflation-fighting  powers.  At the  same 
time,  I recognize  that  certain  improvements  to  the  Credit 
Control  Act may  be desirable.  It is my hope  that  during  the 
next  18 months  Congress  will enact  a new  Credit  Control 
Act  that  saves  the  essential  inflation-fighting  powers  that 
the  act  makes  availabler 
Thirteen  days after’the’sunsetting  of the  CCA,  the 
House  held  hearings  on H.R.  6 124,  a bill “to reduce 
interest  rates,  control  inflation,  and  ensure  the 
availability  of  credit  for  productive  purposes,  and 
promote  economic  recovery  by extending  the  Credit 
Control  Act.”  Specifically,  the  bill would  repeal  the 
i 
’ See  Act  of  December  8,  1980,  94  Stat.  2748-9.  Section  9 
amends  the  CCA  by  adding  to  it Section  2 11,  terminating  the 
authority  conferred  by  the  CCA  on  June  30,  1982. 
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tion  205(a)  to  read 
“Whenever  the  President  determines  that  such  action  is 
necessary  or appropriate  to reduce high leve.k of unemp&wwnf 
in any sector of the economy, of to pfewent  of conhal inflatim  of 
recession,  the  President  may  authorize  the  Board  to regulate 
and control  any wallextensions  of credit.”  [emphasis  added] 
It also  allowed  for limiting  credit  for nonproductive 
purposes.  174 
Typical  of the  arguments  given  in support  of H.R. 
6 124  were  those  by  J.  Morton  Davis,  president  of 
D.  H.  Blair &  Co.,  Inc.,  and  J.  C.  Turner,  general 
president  of  the  International  Union  of  Operating 
Engineers  and  chairman  of the  National  Council  for 
Low  Interest  Rates.  Davis  called  the  CCA  a “spare 
tire”  and  wondered  why  anyone  would  not  want  to 
have  a spare  tire  available.  Turner  argued  that  high 
interest  rates  were  the  “quicksand”  of the  1981-1982 
recession  and  that  the  CCA  provided  “the  only 
avenue  available  for  removing  the  crushing  burden 
of high  and volatile  interest  rates.”  He  also supported 
the  addition  of unemployment  and recession  as “trig- 
gers”  to  allow  use  of  the  Act.17s 
The  Board and the  Reagan  Administration  opposed 
H.R.  6124.  Preston  Martin,  Board  Vice  Chairman 
in  1982,  testified, 
[The  Board  does  not]  believe  that  credit  controls  are  an 
effective,  .efficient,  or fair method  to  deal  with  [unemploy- 
ment,  recession,  high  interest  rates  or]  .  . . inflation  when 
the  more  general  instruments  of monetary  and  fiscal policy 
can  be  used.  Our  experience  with  the  administration  of 
controls  for  a  brief  period‘in  1980  amply  demonstrated 
the  difficulties  encountered  in  the  application  of  credit 
controls.r76 
Former  Board  Vice  Chairman  Frederick  Schultz 
concurred: 
Now;  with  the  benefit  of  20/20  hindsight  .  .  .,  I am  con- 
vinced  that  controls  were  not  the  right  way  to  address  the 
economic  problems  we  experienced  in  early  1980.  .  .  . 
One  reason  some  people  have  proposed  that  credit  con- 
trols  be  used  today  is  that  they  feel  this  would  help  to 
lower  interest  rates  and  aid  the  economy.  .  .  .  Certainly 
one  does  not  lower  interest  rates  by  reducing  credit  sup- 
plies!  So  the  lowering  of  rates  must  be  achieved  by  re- 
ducing  effective  credit  demands,  which  in the  aggregate  is 
not  consistent  with  higher  rates  of spending  and  economic 
activity.  .  .  . 
. . . . We  still found  oursehks  at the  end  of.  . . 1980 with 
the  need  to  deal  with  inflation,  high  interest  rates,  and 
languishing  productivity.  ‘Indeed,  I  think  that  there  is  a 
considerable  risk  that  the  underlying  problems  of  the 
economy  will  be  found  to  be  even  more  intense  once  a 
period  of credit  controls  has  been  ended.  . . . The  quick-fix 
or ‘the bandaid  policy  always  looks  attractive,  but  that  is a 
cruel  deception.  This  is why  I oppose  having  credit  con- 
trols  available  even  on  a  standby  basis,  for  emergency 
situations.177 
‘. 
On  behalf  of  the  Reagan  Administration,  Manuel 
Johnson,  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic 
Policy,  reported  that 
the  Administration  strongly  opposes  the  use  of credit  con- 
trols,  or  any  controls  for  that  matter.  .  .  . 
The  recent  experience  with  credit  controls  in  1980 
exemplifies  virtually  all of the  undesirable  consequences  of 
controls.  .  .  .  Key  industries  targeted  for  relief,  such  as 
housing  and  autos,  collapsed  under  the  weight  of  credit 
scarcity.  Interest  rates  were  temporarily  reduced  but  the 
cutoff  of  credit  at  the  lower  rates  produced  rising  unem- 
ployment  and  a  general  weakening  of  the  economy  that 
subsequently  turned  into  a full scale  recession  from  which 
we  still have  not  fully recovered.  And,  instead  of declining, 
inflation  continued  strong  throughout  the  year. 1’s 
H.R.  6124  died  in committee,  but  its fate and  the 
testimony  given  opposing  it did  not  prevent  an  ex- 
tended  version  of the  bill from  being  introduced  as 
H.R.  1742  just  one. year  later.  In  June  1983,  the 
House  Subcommittee  on Economic  Stabilization  held 
a hearing  on  the  bill,  called  the  Credit  Control  Act 
of 1983.  The  bill amended  the  CCA  of 1969  as H.R. 
6 124  would  have  and  included  a provision  for  the 
Board  to  review  the  financing  of corporate  acquisi- 
tions  and  mergers.  I79 At  the  subcommittee  hearing 
on  the  bill,  Representative  Norman  Shumway 
asserted, 
I have  read  the  bill.  Certainly  no  one  can  quarrel  with  the 
stated  purposes  of  it:  to  reduce  interest  rates,  to  control 
inflation,  to  ensure  the  availability  of credit  for  productive 
purposes  and  to  promote  economic  recovery. 
But  I  would  suggest  [that]  .  .  .  there  is  no  evidence 
whatsoever  that  explicit  control  by the  Federal  Government 
of  credit  availability  and  allocation  will  contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  any  of  these  objectives. 
In  fact,  the  most  recent  experience  we  have  had  with 
credit  controls  under  the  past  administration  proved  to be  a 
disaster.  It  depressed  an  economy  which  was  already 
headed  for a period  of lesser  growth  as  a result  of existing 
trends  and  policies.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Chairman,  you  know  as  well  as  I that  although  the 
bill before  us provides  the  President  standby  authority  only, 
this  President  neither  wants  nor  needs  such  authority. 
He  has  indicated,  in fact,  that  he  will veto  the  legislation 
if sent  to  him.  This,  of course,  is  highly  unlikely  because 
the  Senate  has  no  intention  whatsoever  of considering  the 
measure. 
I can  only  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  introduction  of 
H.R.  1742  and  today’s  hearing  are  both  rather  desperate 
attempts  to  embarrass  the  administration. 
In  the  face  of the  increasingly  bright  signs  of  a healthy 
recovery,  I can perhaps  understand  the-desire  of my friends 
on  the  majority  side  to score  partisan  political  points,  but  I 
don’t  understand  why  this  senseless  and  rathermeaningless 
proposal  was  chosen  as  the  vehicle.rEO 
48  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1990 The  hearing  was  brief,  and  the  bill never  got  out  of 
committee. 
No  bills  have  been  introduced  subsequently  to 
reenact  the  CCA  of  1969.  .For  now,  the  Presiden- 
tial authority  for  selective  credit  controls  conferred 




The  Carter  Administration  apparently  decided  to 
impose  credit  controls  to  signal  that  it was  actively 
fighting  inflation.  The  Board  and  the  Administration 
designed  the  credit  restraint  program  to have minimal 
economic  impact  on  real  production  and  employ- 
ment.  Contrary  to their  expectations,  however,  the 
program’s  immediate  effect  was  to  raise,  not  lower, 
short-term  interest  rates  and  to dramatically  reduce 
consumer  c,onfidence.  Interest  rates  started  down 
within  a month  after  the  program  began  as a decline 
in  consumer  spending  worsened  the  developing 
recession.  The  economy’s  recovery  after ‘the credit 
controls  were  lifted.‘was  as  fast  and  sharp  as  its 
decline  when  they  were  imposed.  Credit  controls 
thus  proved  to  be  a blunt  .policy  instrument  whose 
economic  impact  was  impossib1.e  to  manage. 
At  present,  there  -is  no- legislative  authority  for 
selective  credit  controls  like  those2used  in- 198.O.rsr 
The  only  Presidential  authority  to  regulate  credit  is 
grantedunder  section  S(b)(l)  of the  Trading  With 
The  Enemy  Act  of October  6,  1917, (40  Stat.  415). 
This  act  allows  for  the  investigation,  regulation,  or 
prohibition  of “transfers  of  credit  or  payments  be- 
tween,  by,  through;  or  to  any  banking  institution” 
during  wartime.‘*2 
Although  no  legislative’authority  now  exists  for 
credit  controls,  the  U.S.  experience  with  such  con- 
trols  probably  has  not  come  to  a  close.  This  ex- 
perience  suggests  that  in  times  of rising  prices  and 
interest  rates,  there  are always  voices  advocating  the 
use  of credit  controls.  And  in such  times,  Congress 
grants  the  authority  for such  controls,  despite  its own 
earlier  recognition  of  the  ineffectiveness  and 
economic  harm  that  credit  controls  have  caused.  The 
1980  experience  makes  clear  the  dangers  involved 
in  using  credit’  controls,  to  fight  inflation.  This 
article has reconstructed  the  details of that  experience 
in  the  hope  that  policymakers  will  be  more  aware 
of  the  dangers  of credit  controls  in  the  future. 
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